The opening up of the favela

An ethnographic study on locality in the ‘pacified’ favelas in Rio de Janeiro.

Ellen Sluis; 3025853
Supervisor: Jolle Demmers
MA Conflict Studies and Human Rights
Faculty of Humanities
Universiteit Utrecht
27/08/2011
Para Eddu Grau e o Complexo do Alemão
Table of contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS.................................................................................................................... 3
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS..................................................................................................................... 4
PREFACE: THE “TELEFAIRY TALE” OF COMPLEXO DO ALEMÃO................................................... 5
INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................................. 9
CHAPTER 1: LIQUID PEACE AND TIMES OF UNCERTAINTY.......................................................... 16
CHAPTER 2: THE FAVELA GOES GLOBAL, COCA COLA GOES LOCAL........................................ 37
CHAPTER 3: CULTURE AND CITIZENSHIP..................................................................................... 54
CONCLUSION...................................................................................................................................... 70
REFERENCES..................................................................................................................................... 73
Acknowledgements

This research let to yet another trip to Brazil, the country that is increasingly becoming my second home. Although through my ability to speak Portuguese and the Master’s course Conflict Studies and Human Rights research in countries like Angola or Mozambique would be commonplace, I chose Brazil. Again. Brazil fascinates me on numerous aspects, and even after spending there two and a half years, this trip has made me even more passionate and committed to the country. This trip was definitely the most intense, although not only in a positive sense. The more we open up ourselves to understand reality, the more this reality affects us.

This thesis would not exist without Eddu Grau. As a resident of Complexo do Alemão, he dedicated a significant part of his time to help me become part of the community; showing me around, introducing me to residents, taking me to events and arranging a home for me at his mother’s place. And, most important, he became a great friend. Our numerous nights of conversation have laid the foundation of this thesis.

Special thanks go to Leiloka, my lovely Brazilian mother and Carlinhos, my brother, who took so good care of me and made me feel at home. Furthermore, thanks to the moleques in Alvorada (especially Gabriel and Brancão), Elaine, Descolando Ideias, and all the other residents that have not only given shape to my thesis, but have made my stay in Complexo do Alemão an unforgettable experience. In addition, I want to thank Ruiz for the amazing time in Olinda, which I needed so much at that moment!

I want to thank the Dutch Consulate, and Consul General Paul Comenencia in particular, for their support during my stay. Back in the Netherlands, I want to thank the Hendrik Muller Fonds for financial support. Furthermore, many thanks to my supervisor Jolle Demmers for her incredibly clarifying meetings, supportive words and enthusiasm about my research, encouraging me to tell my story. My roommates for their patience in the few moments I have been at home. My parents and especially my mother for taking care of me in the midst of my thesis-stress. Great thanks go to Daniela for editing my thesis. And last but not least I want to thank Fei An, not only for intellectual support and correction, but for being my buddy and special friend.
PREFACE: The “Telefairy Tale” of Complexo do Alemão

Isn’t it remarkable that a city like Brasília, in the shape of an airplane and whereof every square meter has been calculated and planned to function optimally, has turned out to be a total failure, while the favela in all its disorganisation and chaos manages to function properly? Why would you simply erase these existing structures?

Soon after I arrived in Rio someone told me about the teleférico (cable car) that was built in Complexo do Alemão over the past year and a half. From that moment on it drew my attention. When I arrived in March it was already built, but not yet working. It would only be inaugurated in July, a few days after I had returned to the Netherlands. But during my stay the prominence of the stations already caused a lot of discussion. It is such an enormous object that you can see it even from the Cristo Redentor. Just imagine using a cable car as a daily way of transport to work, or to visit a friend. The general opinion of people not living in Complexo do Alemão is positive. “That thing is really going to improve their mobility”.

Residents of Complexo do Alemão had different views: “It’s a tourist attraction for Cabral to show the favela to the rich!” , “It passes over my house, so everyone can see my messy courtyard. I will lose my privacy!”, “I won’t take a step inside these cars, I’m afraid of height.” and “I’ll be exciting! The view will be marvellous. But it’s not really necessary” were the most common answers to the question what residents think of the teleférico. In Complexo do Alemão transport is organised by combis (small vans) and mototaxis (motor cycle taxis), which bring residents up the hill for no more than two to three Reais. For going down by combi you pay only one Real. It is cheap, fast and efficient, and there are connections to most parts of the city (train and subway stations, buses and vans to other neighbourhoods). Also, many residents make a living driving these combis and mototaxis. Why a teleférico that is outsourced to a French company, hiring people from all over Brazil? Moreover, there are only five stations serving over 250,000 inhabitants. This means that if a resident would use the teleférico to travel inside the community, the nearest station is likely to be more distant than his or her destination. Most of the people, however, use transport to go to the asfalto, for work or school. Unfortunately, the teleférico connects to the train but not to the subway, the latter being a faster and much more convenient form of transport to go downtown. Why a teleférico?

---

1 This chapter is an adapted version of an earlier published blogpost by myself. See http://cheeseandchina.wordpress.com/2011/06/16/the-telefairy-tale-of-complexo-do-alemao/
2 Suze, personal communication, 27/05/2011.
3 Sergio Cabral is the governor of the state Rio de Janeiro.
4 1 – 1,50 dollar.
5 Asphalt; referring to the city; outside of the favela.
The residents told me that they were not asked if they wanted one.

The stations are enormous, coloured, buildings made of concrete in the middle of the myriad of small brick houses built one above the other in a labyrinth of alleys. Around the stations there is usually a square with tables and seats, a playground or football court, and a belvedere in front of the higher located stations to see the view of the favela on top of the hill. For the construction of these “islands of wealth”, however, plenty of houses had to be removed and the inhabitants of these houses were replaced to newly built apartments down the hill, near the asfalto. Even though the new apartments are fancy and some people think it is an improvement, others would have preferred to stay but had no other option. A place of tight social bonds, memories and where most of them have lived all their life is simply erased for the construction of the teleférico.

The project is part of the PAC⁶ project, commissioned by the federal government and outsourced to the French company POMA⁷. Stories varied from “a lot of residents are employed” to “only people from other parts of Brazil are working here”, and I have seen both. Some construction workers told me they were from the community, others were from different neighbourhoods, or even from other states. A local project connects different actors on a global scale—the government, a foreign private company and construction workers from all over Brazil—thus striving for maximum efficiency rather than aiming at the stimulation of the local

---

⁶ PAC: Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento/Program of the Acceleration of Growth.
economy and the creation of local jobs. Moreover, people explain that the teleférico could have benefited them economically if they were allowed to open shops or build stands to sell goods in the stations. However, allegedly these places have been assigned to fast food chains such as McDonalds. If they hire personnel from the community—which is not often the case as recruitment usually occurs centrally—residents would make no more than a minimum salary.

“It’s a tourist attraction” also reflects a general increase of interest in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro. Especially after the ‘pacification’ project initiated in November 2010, tourists, NGO workers, researchers and artists want to enter the favelas to set up projects or just take a look at the local way of life. Due to the two major events taking place in the next five years (the World Cup in 2014 and the Olympic Games in 2016) the world’s eyes are focused on Rio de Janeiro. Rather than simply ‘cleansing’ these ‘barbaric’ areas, as happened in South Africa, a different strategy is to transform these areas in tourist hotspots, using poverty to attract tourists and, simultaneously, to demonstrate how the government is now ‘present’ in these territories that used to be occupied by drugs gangs. “It’s all make-up! [maquiagem]” Tourists get to see the newly constructed squares around the stations and take a ride in the teleférico. They will not see the lixão and the parts of the morro that still lack sewage, electricity and tapped water.

Besides the government and the executing company, specialists have played a role in the elaboration of the project. The stations are not only impressive buildings; they are also the only authorised constructions on top of the hills. Most of the other PAC projects occur near the asfalto, which causes frustration among residents who live in higher areas. Apparently, as an architect told me, the focus on the lower part of the hill is justified as there is a general consensus among urban planners that there should not be built anything above 100 meters uphill, because of ecological reasons (erosion, parts of the favela sliding down through heavy rainfall, etc.). Either this is incorrect and just serves to justify certain choices and interests (community residents got furious when I discussed this with them: “They just want to remove the favela!”), or the cable car stations are built in areas of risk. In any case this is contradictory, which in itself is a terrible given. The favela should not be a place for urban experiments, as it is the home of a large part of the population of Rio de Janeiro.

If they’d asked what the community really needed, they would have built schools, or a university. In what is considered the biggest complex of favelas of Rio de Janeiro there are only two schools, let alone a university. But they don’t listen to us. Instead, they built a teleférico of 500 million Dollars.

I have used the teleférico as an introductory example of the many changes occurring in the community simultaneous to the ‘pacification’ project; or in other words, the entrance of the state (PAC) and the market (POMA). As will become clear in the chapters of this thesis, this example reflects the way in which many different actors are entering the community, all claiming this territory that used to be in hands of the drugs traffickers until the ‘pacification’. Not only

---

9 Dump, area with a lot of garbage.
10 Hill, most people use the word morro to talk about the community as it is located on a hill.
11 Other PAC projects in the community include the apartments and asphaltting.
12 Eddu Grau, personal communication, 01/05/2011.
in this thesis, but in the eyes of most of the *Cariocas*,\textsuperscript{13} the *teleférico* is symbolic for this new era.

\textsuperscript{13} Carioca refers to “from Rio”, in this sense the people of Rio.
Introduction

In November 2010 Complexo do Alemão, until then considered one of the most dangerous favelas of Rio de Janeiro, was invaded by the military police (BOPE).\(^{14}\) For two days heavily armed police, helicopters and the infamous *caveirões\(^{15}\) circulated through the community in order to take over this territory from the hands of the parallel power of drugs traffickers, who gained control over these areas during the decades of the state’s absence.\(^{16}\) When the drugs traffickers had fled from the community the military police planted a Brazilian flag on top of one of the highest and most symbolic spots of Complexo do Alemão: the cable car station at Coqueiro square.\(^{17}\) Coqueiro used to be a very contested place. There used to be a weekly *baile funk* (funk party) and the media has reported extensively on the drugs fair at the square, the gunfire (*tiroteio*) between the traffickers and the police that used to take place, the barbecues held in the residences of the drugs traffickers who lived at Coqueiros, and so forth.\(^{18}\) The national flag, however, can be seen as symbolic to the state’s recuperation of this territory, which until then was controlled by a parallel power. The flag suggests the state’s presence from now on, unity of the Brazilian people (now also including the formerly discriminated favela residents) and citizenship. The flag represents the initiation of a new era: an era of **peace.**

*Complexo do Alemão*

Complexo do Alemão is a complex consisting of thirteen favelas and in total counts about 300,000 residents. This is more or less the size of Utrecht, the third biggest city of the Netherlands. Until the invasion by the Brazilian army it used to be controlled by drugs faction Comando Vermelho and used to be framed by the media as the “heart of evil” and a “convergence of marginalised”\(^{19}\). But also, and much more, it is the home of hundreds of thousand *Cariocas* (residents of Rio de Janeiro). In the community people have a chat. They say good

\(^{14}\) *Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais da Polícia Militar* (Special Police Operations’ Batallion of the military police).

\(^{15}\) Popular denomination for a tank, especially used in Rio de Janeiro to refer to the BOPE’s tanks, as they are marked with a skull.

\(^{16}\) In fact, the state’s absence is subject to discussion, as some argue that the state in fact could be seen as the corrupt police, which is instead very present in the favelas; as suggests for instance the movie *Tropa de Elite II*. By ‘the state’s absence’ I refer to the absence of the state’s institutions and public services.


\(^{18}\) R7 reports on an investigation by the Civil Police, which reveals the existence of a wholesale market for drugs and weapons at the square. Besides that, the square is often described as the site where many drugs traffickers hang out. Also, Coqueiro Square is considered the “headquarter” of Complexo do Alemão. Drugs traffickers organise barbecues and several parties at the square. See for instance: Mario Hugo Monken (20/03/2010) “Complexo do Alemão tem “bunkers” e feira atacadista de drogas e armas”, R7. Retrieved from http://noticias.r7.com/cidades/noticias/complexo-do-alemao-tem-bunkers-e-feira-atacadista-de-drogas-e-armas-20100319.html at 26/06/2011.

morning and good night. There are hardworking people and the so-called *malandros* (rogues). There is funk, pagode and forró, but also reggae, hip-hop and rock. There is a myriad of butcheries, greengrocers, pharmacies for the daily groceries and bakeries sell not only bread, but also roasted chicken and beer. Evangelic churches pop up at every street corner. Some people have a HD TV, laptop and Internet connection; others lack electricity, tapped water and sewerage. Houses vary from wooden huts to fancy houses with swimming pools. Some people go out to Lapa\(^{20}\) every weekend while others suffer from hunger. And the view from the highest parts of the hilly area is definitely the best view of the city. The favela is much more than a ‘heart of evil’, and instead a very diverse place.

Given its size Complexo do Alemão could be considered a city on its own, and in fact the community has managed to survive basically autonomously and separated from the rest of society. Under the power of the drugs traffickers a local system (transport, housing, gas, water and electricity, garbage) emerged that seems disorganised at first sight, but over the years has adapted to the local culture and social structures. Some people, especially non-Brazilians, have asked me: “But can you live there normally? Do you have a toilet? A shower?” Yes. Of course. A German tourist I met who told me about the *favela tour* he had done in Rocinha (a large and not yet ‘pacified’ favela) told me that they stopped to have coffee and a snack in a particular bakery. When I asked whether they could choose to go to another bakery the German said: “No, because out of security reasons the tour guides decide where we stop and what places we visit. And besides that, I don’t think there are many other bakeries in the favela.” This is not true; in *Rocinha* there is even a Bob’s Burgers.\(^{21}\) What, in my opinion, defines the favela most is not a classification based on economic arrangements, but on social and racial factors. The favela is ‘separated’ from the rest of society not because it is a place where there is ‘nothing’, but rather because the rest of society discriminates against its residents. This hampers residents’ access to good health care, proper education, efficient transport to other parts of the city, culture, employment opportunities and the like. The government must take into account these local structures when ‘pacifying’ these areas. An important question in this regard is whether ‘peace’ will mean the end of the discrimination of the favela.

*Pacification*

The invasion of Complexo do Alemão initiated the ‘pacification’ of the community by the *Forças Armadas da Pacificação* (Armed Forces of the Pacification; sometimes also defined as *Forças da Pacificação* – Forces of the Pacification) as part of the general pacification project in the city of Rio de Janeiro. Since 2008 this project has implemented a *Unidade Policial Pacificadora* (UPP; Pacification Police Unit) in a number of favelas throughout the city. The Ministry of Public Security describes the aim of the project as following:

> The Pacification Police Unit is a new model of Public Security and a new way of policing that promotes the approximation between the population and the police, in order to strengthen social policy within the communities. Through the recuperation of these territories lost to drugs traffickers, and recently, to militias, the UPPs bring peace to the communities.

---

\(^{20}\) Bohemian neighbourhood of the city, popular among middle class youth, tourists, artists and intellectuals.

\(^{21}\) A Brazilian Fast Food chain. See also: Sneed, 2007: 27
In this way this special police will provide security and order, but also improve the basic public services and facilities such as housing, education and health care. The recuperation of these lost territories is claimed to be part of the city’s preparation for two major events taking place in the coming years; the World Cup in 2014 and the Olympic Games in 2016. Security in the city has to be improved for the realisation of these events and, as the favela is seen as the source of criminality and violence, these areas need to be organised. Complexo do Alemão was planned to be ‘pacified’ by an UPP only in late 2011, but the situation got completely out of hand as one year earlier a ‘wave of violence’ engulfed Rio de Janeiro. Drugs traffickers started to terrorise the city and dozens of cars were torched the week before the invasion. Governor Sergio Cabral decided to anticipate the ‘pacification’ process and got support by the federal government to implement the armed forces in both Complexo do Alemão and neighbouring favela Complexo da Penha. Different than an UPP police, these two favelas are occupied by the army. Even though both forces aim at peace, the two cannot be simply compared. While the UPP police are trained to interact with and serve the community, soldiers are trained to fight the enemy. But from the community the attitude towards both forces differs as well. The police have always repressed and frightened community residents, and are seen as corrupt and evil, discriminating the black poor. Soldiers, on the other hand, are often seen as more ‘neutral’. Nevertheless, the ‘pacification’ entails much more than the mere substitution of the drugs traffickers by the armed forces.

Radical changes: entrance of the state – market annex

About six months before the invasion the PAC (Acceleration of Growth Program by the federal government) has initiated in the community in order to improve the local infrastructure. Streets are paved, squares and playgrounds are constructed, apartments are built, houses at risk removed and the inhabitants replaced to these apartments. Part of this project is also the construction of the cable car I mentioned in the preface. Commissioned by the municipality construction companies enter the community to work on these projects. Besides the PAC project, local bank branches, real estate agencies, electricity, gas, water and telecom companies are arriving as the informal structures of the community are now criminalised. Also, since the ‘pacification’ project the favela is becoming pop. ‘Outsiders’ increasingly want to enter; NGOs, citizen initiatives, the media and tourists. An ideological wall that used to segregate the favela is now being torn down. ‘Peace’ becomes the new label that ‘sells’ the favela.

In this way, ‘peace’ involves much more than the mere end of violence. Machado, who wrote one of the first articles on the UPP, explains how the discourse on pacification implies a division between war and peace, in which favela life is seen as opposed to peace. This stigmatises the favela and reinforces a connotation of the favela with barbarism, violence or even war.


24 Brazilian Portuguese for “hyped”, an shortening of “popular”.
Without a providing a precise connotation of ‘social inclusion’ the Secretary of Public Security claims to pacify these violent communities by socially including the people living there, thus fighting social inequality. Machado critically points to the fact that in a capitalist system, that is unequal by definition, it is always necessary to ‘include’ subordinates.\textsuperscript{25} In this way, the ‘pacification’ is inherently a process of exercising power over these territories rather than an attempt to achieve social equity. Moreover, in this process of exercising power one must look beyond the state. In a globalising world the state and global market can no longer be seen as separated and ‘inclusion’, or rather, citizenship, takes on different dimensions. Local structures are included in the state’s structures, which means a substitution of a local system by another, that of the state. Besides that, the entrance of the market includes these local structures even on another, global, level. The inclusion of the favela in a global territory allows neoliberalism to enter and control these areas of new potential, but at the same time it enables residents’ involvement in democratic activities on a global scale. In this way, the struggle over territory becomes very complex. While the neoliberal state goes local, the favela goes global.

This thesis seeks to examine the ‘pacification’ process in terms of space. The ‘pacification’ is a struggle over territory that is fought between different actors (the state, the drugs traffickers, the residents but also the market and NGOs). The process of claiming space, in this process, should not be merely seen as related to a geographical, or physical, territory, as described by David Storey.\textsuperscript{26} Space, or rather, locality can also be constructed through social processes, as described by Arjun Appadurai. In this thesis, I see locality as constructed by a feeling of belonging, identity and meaning. In Complexo do Alemão, local culture is embedded in the social structures that have emerged, which have constituted a strong feeling of belonging. The substitution of the local system by another is very complex, as this causes radical changes in the local structures and community life. At the same time, the favela ‘goes global’ with the aid of new media and the articulation to global actors. The favela’s territory thus becomes virtual, and inherently linked to a favela identity. Finally, locality can also be seen as the production of meaning, or culture. In this regard, the present research will revolve around the central question: How do residents of Complexo do Alemão respond spatially to the entrance of the Neoliberal state, aided by the ‘pacification’ project?

I have deliberately looked at the entrance of the neoliberal state rather than the armed forces in particular, as, in relation to space, the market becomes increasingly inseparable from the state. As in a globalising world notions of space radically change, ethnographic research needs to take into account the social effects of neoliberalism such as the blurring of difference between former conceptions of levels of society and government. New forms of regionalism and translocality emerge, and highly localised forms of authority and global forms of activism need to be studied alternatively as they can no longer be analysed as “microcosms of some system”\textsuperscript{27}. Also, while ‘respond’ implies an active form of behaviour, I have sought for passive behaviour as well. That is, responses can often be recognised as the (subtle) ways in which the resident’s daily life is affected. Many residents do not explicitly criticise, neither advocate, the entrance of the state, but in fact do respond to it when they face and often accept the some-

\textsuperscript{25} Machado, 2010: 4.
\textsuperscript{26} See: Storey, 2001.
\textsuperscript{27} Greenhouse, 2010: 5.
times profound changes in their daily routines that come with the occupation.

By way of three stories I will reveal the different ways in which space is claimed by the different actors and how power is contested. In chapter 1 I describe how the substitution of the local informal structures by the ‘formal’ laws and rules of the state impacts the residents’ everyday lives and social structures. Chapter 2 demonstrates how the favela is opening up, which causes a complex interaction between community residents and outside (regional, national and global) actors in a virtual space. In chapter 3 I address the use of culture as a means to promote citizenship, and how the struggle over meaning, through culture, is fought between different actors.

Photo 2 - The view from the hill.

Methodological notes

In March 2011 I travelled to Rio de Janeiro for four months of research. I arrived in the middle of the chaos of carnaval and got to experience this national party in which, as is often said, differences of class and race disappear. When a few days later the city returned to ‘normal’ I started to prepare myself for my research. I found an apartment in Glória, a middle class neighbourhood near the centre, and via an employee of the State Secretary of Culture I got in touch with Eddu Grau, a resident of Complexo do Alemão. While I was still deciding whether I would
study the UPP or the occupation by the army I visited Complexo do Alemão for the first time. My first experience with the soldiers I found so impressive that I became curious to know more. But more importantly; Eddu Grau’s enthusiasm to guide me through the community and help me to conduct my research was determining.

The first weeks I travelled to and from the community from my house in Glória, which used to take me about an hour and a half. However, despite many discouragements by people from the ‘city’, I decided to move to Complexo do Alemão. I felt a distance between the residents and myself that was not only physical. While from the middle and upper classes there exists a prejudice about the favela, from the favela itself there exists a prejudice too, and I felt it constantly. I went there to research their lives, but apparently I did not want to live there. The favela is ‘hot’, but when it comes to living, we prefer samba instead of funk. This is a real pity, because especially night life teaches you much about the day to day life of the people. Over a beer you really get to know someone and his or her stories. And in the bakery you see how people interact with each other.

I felt not only the need, but also the moral obligation to move there. It did not feel right to go there, acquire my data, and leave again. This is something I will elaborate on in chapter 3. The idea that living there is ‘less exploitative’ than not living there might be just a feeling rather than a well grounded scientific argument, as one might still wonder what I am offering them return. What will my research mean for the community residents? What will it change? Nevertheless, the least I could do was understand their lives as good as possible, in order to write something that makes sense.

Also, I realised that the topic was very sensitive. Most is said not by people’s words but by their behaviour, habits and day to day life. The only way to understand this is to go live with them and get to know their local social reality. So, each day I had my walk through the community, by myself, but soon accompanied by curious residents who wanted to chat. I no longer really used my voice recorder, as people used to feel very uncomfortable, including myself, which really hampered the fluidity of the conversation. I realised that the most valuable information I found in informal interactions, at unexpected moments, such as a particular comment, joke, story, question or reaction to the things that happened around me during my stay. Equipped with my small notebook and pen I immersed myself in their lives.

*A few comments*...

1. I felt the need to write ‘pacification’ parenthesised, as I will continue to do in this entire thesis, as it is a word that very strongly connotes a positive conclusion of the project, while to my opinion we cannot yet speak of ‘peace’. Peace is of course a very complex phenomenon (what in fact *is* peace?), although for me one thing is sure: as long as there are arms and ‘the armed forces of the pacification’ involved, I do not believe that peace can be achieved. Neither did I want to write ‘occupation’ instead, as this word immediately excludes any outcome that has to do with peace, which is also not my intention.

2. I have thought a lot about the term I would use to refer to ‘favela’. Favela has a rather am-

---

Samba is music typically played in Lapa and Santa Teresa, while funk is characteristic of the favela.
biguous connotation; it is prejudging on the one hand, but popular to use on the other hand. I have chosen to write ‘community’ when talking particularly about the community; Complexo do Alemão, as residents use to refer to their community in this way. When I talk about the community or the favelas from Rio de Janeiro from a general perspective, I will use the term ‘favela’.

3. What should be noted on forehand is the myriad of different people living in the community. While the favela resident is often seen as a ‘type of person’, representing a social (and racialised) class, few elaborate on the diversity within the community. I experienced myself how I saw, in the beginning, the residents as ‘similar’ people, but over time I started to distinguish the Evangelists, the funkeiros, the roqueiros (rockers), the rastas, the family men, businessmen, hardworking and single mothers, and so forth. But also the different socio-economical classes within the community, often but not always indicating their degree of involvement with favela life. Those who live near the asfalto are often of a higher socio-economical class than those living on top of the hill. What is also important to take into account is the fact that some residents live in the favela out of necessity, actually preferring to live somewhere else, while others could afford a house in ‘better’ neighbourhoods but would never replace the favela for the asfalto. The favela is their home. This is important, as the particular groups of focus in the research not necessarily represent the general opinion or behaviour of ‘the community resident’. Rather, I have chosen to highlight three different cases.

It is therefore not my attempt to answer the question whether the ‘pacification’ is better or worse than life under the rule of the drugs traffickers. This would be an impossible task to do, but also, I doubt the usefulness of such a comparison. First, many people (living in the community, but also people from outside interested in the topic) feel that they have to choose between these two options, which of course is nonsense. We could very well be critical of both situations, thus demanding changes in the new approach without suggesting a return of the traffickers. Because, secondly, it is obvious that we—at least I—do not prefer the former situation, even though some people strongly long back to the past times. Precisely because the lack of this unanimous ‘yes’ to the entrance of the neoliberal state we should look at what is actually going on in the community. We must with the most careful attention take into account the existent social, cultural, economical and political structures, in order to understand the impact and thus the positive and negative consequences of the ‘pacification’.
CHAPTER 1: Liquid Peace and Times of Uncertainty

I want to be a judge when I grow up, to lock up all the bad people.
- Who are the bad people? The police. I'll release all the bandits and lock up the police. They are the bad guys.  

When June arrived I saw the first kites up in the air. From that moment on every following weekend the amount of people kiting on the lajes (rooftops) or squares increased until the real explosion during the school holidays of July. Every Saturday and Sunday afternoon kids, adolescents and men were competing to cut each other's strings. They yell, scream, berate, laugh, compete and collaborate. When looking up to the cable car plenty of kites dangling with their strings entwined in the tick wires. It is an idyllic scene, a vibrant atmosphere, so much happiness and solidarity.

Although kiting is kind of a cliché; a very well known and often described characteristic of favela life, I realised that it was also a very symbolic act responding these ‘new times’ inaugurated with the ‘pacification’. Perhaps not many people would see it this way, but while kiting had become increasingly absent over the past years when drugs trafficking had risen to situations in which ten year old boys walked around with rifles, the kiting I witnessed ‘celebrated’ these children’s return to their childhood: playing. Artist and resident of Complexo do Alemão Eddu Grau explains in an interview at his own laje—that offered a perfect view on the kites—that kiting is a cry for freedom. It is an escape from everyday life and occurs on another level, or scale.

The kite stops being a mere piece of paper and wood, and becomes an extension of the human being that controls it. During that very moment, the sensation of freedom takes over, almost magically. You can feel the strength of the wind passing through your body. You are looking at the world from above. There are no boundaries, factions [drugs factions], colour, race or society.

When on their laje there is another dimension of space. They find themselves above the alleys and streets, which allows direct interaction with one another from other and more distant streets. They escape from the surveillance of the soldiers. They are who control and dominate that space.

Back at the streets and alleys, however, the situation is different. With the entrance of the state many things have changed. Not only are the drugs traffickers replaced by soldiers and has overt violence significantly decreased, a complete parallel society with its proper laws, rules, decrees and values is replaced by the ‘formal’ system of the state. The case in point of this

---

29 Conversation between me and a 10 year old boy, 31/05/2011.
30 Eddu Grau (19/06/2011) in an interview with CUFA in preparation for the final of Favela Festival (see below).
31 Eddu Grau, interview, 19/06/2011.
chapter is a particular area in Alvorada; one of the most densely populated communities of Complexo do Alemão and relatively distant from the asfalto. It is a paved square/parking lot in front of a lanchoneta (snack bar) and an Evangelical church—where many people gather to chat—and the street that goes in the direction of another square, which is Coqueiros. Halfway the street there is a largo\textsuperscript{32} called Vivi where used to be another weekly baile funk. After the occupation a lot of construction works by the PAC are taking place in this area, removing a lot of houses of residents (including the houses of the former drugs traffickers), building the cable car station, thus radically transforming the appearance of the area. Besides that, there is a very strong presence of soldiers patrolling the area for drugs trafficking, drugs consumption and other forms of disobedience and disorder. This chapter examines the way in which residents respond to the physical presence of the army and how the criminalisation of the informal structures and the implementation of the state’s laws, rules and decrees in many ways impact the lives of the residents, and not only those who used to be involved in drugs trafficking.

New Liberty

![Photo 2 - Kiting.](photo2.png)

discursive reconstruction of a divide between borderlands and metropolitan areas, through which elites establish “[...] a formative contrast between borderland traits of barbarity, excess and irrationality, and metropolitan characteristics of civility, restraint and rationality”.\textsuperscript{33} By discriminating against (poor) favela residents, framing their territories as dangerous, irrational and uncivilized, their communities are implicitly referred to as borderlands, seen by the elite as barbarian areas that threaten civilized urban life. By making this distinction between the favelas and the “civilized areas” of the city, the elite provides a justification for intervention in these dangerous places in order to maintain order, simultaneously increasing a form of hegemony and power. What is particularly relevant in this divide is that when I found myself in these borderlands I came to realize that characteristics of ‘civility, restraint and rationality’ are not simply applicable to these borderlands, as the latter have developed their own structures and rules over the past decades.

\textsuperscript{32} A small square, usually a broadening of the street that is used as a square.

\textsuperscript{33} Duffield, 2002: 1025.
During my fieldwork I have been talking a lot to a group of adolescents, mostly boys of 15-25 years old, in Alvorada. I met them the day I moved to Alvorada, and it was one of the first nights I spent in the community. It was also the first time I had a real conversation with a group of ‘gangster-ish’ looking young men who would not, like most others of their age, only ask me how you say crack in Dutch or tell me that they want to kick the asses of the soldiers (although this also reveals something about their relation with drugs and the soldiers respectively). These young men actually wanted to tell me a lot about the ‘pacification’, the past times, and particularly, what had changed for them. I became fascinated by the lives of these boys and in the following months we spent numerous nights chatting in front of the lanchoneta. I have never explicitly asked about their ‘degree of involvement’ in trafficking. I knew that they used to live (and still live) closely together with crime and criminals, but I did not want to attack them with my blunt curiosity and besides that, it does not matter as they are residents of the community just as much as others. Even though they do not represent the general opinion of the community residents, they represent a group that perhaps is the most affected by the ‘pacification’ process.

After some time I started to realise that their reality, which is so often framed as barbaric, violent and illegal, is a reality that makes more sense to them than the ‘civilised’ reality. One of them, a 19 year old boy named Rafael, told me how after the occupation their daily reality has changed radically.

Imagine that you would be taken out of the Netherlands and are thrown somewhere you don’t know the rules, you don’t understand the local reality, the language. That’s how I feel here today. I don’t belong to this society.34

In a later conversation Rafael even used the comparison of the nazis while referring to the occupation by the soldiers. “Imagine that the Netherlands would suddenly be occupied by the nazis.”35 Those adolescents expressed a very radical criticism about the current situation and unanimously agreed that it was much better before the occupation, when the drugs gangs used to rule. I asked them if the occupation, and the entrance of the state and the market constructing squares, the cable car for public transport, a cinema and a health care centre had not brought anything good in their favela. Would they perhaps think more positively about the current situation if the state would create opportunities for them to study or find a job?

Let’s be honest here. We liked the trafico and we won’t prefer anything but the situation before the occupation.36

I realized that these words glorifying criminality were not a matter of choice. Besides a serious distrust and wariness towards the state and its interests, as it has never done anything to benefit their favela before, people do not see the opportunities of this other reality in which they would study and find a job. Even though education is seriously lacking, in theory they could create a way out of this life. However, in practice this turns out to be much more complicated. Informal or sometimes even criminal life—the boundary between the two is difficult to draw

34 Rafael, personal communication, 15/04/2011.
35 Rafael, personal communication, 19/05/2011.
36 Rafael, personal communication, 15/04/2011.
has been their reality as long as they can remember, and seems like the only opportunity. It looks like those words praising crime is an attitude camouflaging this idea that they are excluded from society and that those opportunities do not exist for them.

These adolescents expressed a strong feeling of locality inside the community as opposed to outside. Now that the army has entered, their physical territory has been taken, but they still express a feeling of belonging, to one another and to their ‘former’ life, which in fact continues to exist. Fernandes describes how in barrios in Caracas the marginalised have always been excluded and a through a history of slavery and racial exclusion community residents construct a feeling of belonging. They take on cultural identities that create new bonds based on culture and class. The residents of these barrios do not identify themselves with the rest of society, they do not even consider themselves part of civil society. In the case of these adolescents I felt a similar feeling of belonging that is reinforced by their exclusion.

Arjun Appadurai argues that while in anthropology the spatial production of locality has been copiously documented, the social logic of locality has gained much less attention. Rather than spatial or scalar, he describes locality as relational and contextual. By this he means that locality is a “structure of feeling which is produced by particular forms of intentional activities and yields particular sorts of material effects”. In this sense, locality is established through the exercise of power rather than through geographical boundaries. In order to explain this, Appadurai uses the concept of locality versus neighbourhood. Neighbourhoods refer to already existing social forms and locality is seen as a product of it. That is, the already existing social forms (power relations, socio-political and economic structures, etc.) in society produce locality. It is, different than locality in a static and territorial interpretation, produced within these social forms.

Through its physical presence the army is breaking into these socio-political structures, as demonstrate the grievances of the adolescents. Clearly, the way in which these adolescents oppose themselves to this other authority maintains this feeling of belonging and in a way reproduces locality. At the same time, however, new rules and laws implemented by the army more profoundly impact the local structures both in socio-political and economical terms, as I will describe below.

The media often speak of the liberation of the favela residents from the oppressive power of the drugs gangs, framing liberty in terms of decreased violence and the freeing from the oppressive behaviour by the drugs gangs. In a news item on the ‘pacification’ by Rede TV a reporter tells how before the entrance of the army residents needed to identify themselves when they would enter and exit the community. In the second part of the reportage another reporter explains: “No one used to go out on the streets in the evening because they feared for

---

37 Fernandes, 2010: 97.
38 Fernandes, 2010: 100.
the traffickers”.

When talking to community residents the perception of liberty is rather ambiguous, or very relative. Some residents feel in several ways oppressed by the soldiers and claim to have lost their liberty. They are inspected every once in a while with no clear reason. Several dark-skinned boys commented that they are always inspected, while their whiter friends hardly ever are. Clothing similar to that of traffickers, such as a cap, sneakers, and a particular haircut (a bleached upper part of the hair, similar to a mohawk but only on top of the head) is also a guarantee for inspection. Furthermore, residents have to declare where they are going or why they are on the streets late at night. Several residents, particularly girls, expressed that they do no longer feel comfortable and safe at night. They told me how some soldiers have demonstrated sexually offensive or even abusive behaviour. Whereas, allegedly, the traffickers used to protect them and punish sexually abusive behaviour by male residents or visitors, the soldiers themselves are guilty of these practices. Residents, in general, lack confidence in the soldiers as they have proven to be incapable to deal with the local social structures.

Different than the bandits, they [the soldiers] don’t know who is a criminal and who is an honest resident. As a consequence, they treat everyone as a suspected criminal! That scares us as residents, we can’t rely on them [the soldiers].

Not only stressed this woman the unreliability of the soldiers, she also differentiated between ‘bandits’ (the drugs traffickers) and ‘criminals’ (persons guilty of practices considered wrong according to the rules and laws of the community), while in theory both would be criminals. Apparently, even though they are involved in criminality, she addresses some kind of reliability to the drugs traffickers.

The army’s uncertainty about who is and who is not a criminal is also reflected in several forms of control and vigilance. One of the most symbolic examples I found the marking of houses that have been inspected with a particular green sign in the shape of a hot-air balloon. The administration of this inspection-project could very well be done digitally, or in any form apart from the physical marking of houses through a painted sign on their doors or walls. Through these signs the army very clearly marks its territory within the community. In terms of vigilance, cameras in front of the cable car station and the use of binoculars to watch residents from up the hill allow the soldiers to monitor drugs trafficking or consumption. Some residents even told me that the soldiers use eavesdropping devices to record suspected conversations, but I have not been able to verify this. The fact, however, that a resident assures this to me demonstrates his general opinion about the soldiers, trying to convince me that they are repressive and controlling rather than protecting.

The above reflects a general tendency in a globalising world that is extensively elaborated upon by several authors, such as Saskia Sassen, Zygmunt Bauman, Mark Duffield, and others. Sassen notes the distorted balance between public privacy and government transparency in which there is a strong tendency towards violating the privacy of citizens and in-

44 Suzana, 20, Grota, 28/03/2011.
45 Sassen, 2006; Bauman, 2007; Duffield, 2002.
creased government secrecy, leading to increased control over citizens by both the government and the market. Through the construction of a particular enemy or danger, which can be terrorism in the western world as the case in point of these authors, but in this particular case is favela life and criminality. By discriminating those who ‘praise crime’ and suggesting that they are dangerous the state creates a threat to public security and simultaneously denies any responsibility for the existence of these abandoned and dangerous territories. And in this way increased control is justified under the guise of improved security.

Photo 3 - Soldiers mark the houses of the residents they have inspected.

**New rules, new criminality**

The state has entered the community in order to organise these zones of barbarity and to include the community residents into the state’s bureaucracy. Through the state’s space-claiming practices, it limits the context producing capacity of neighbourhoods and tries to exercise authority over localities. In the case of the occupation of the Complexo do Alemão this occurs not only through the physical presence of the army, but also through the ‘formalisation’ of informal economies and the new rules and laws that are implemented. Ferguson & Gupta have

---

written on the production of locality by the state, which they call *spatialization*. In an ethno-
graphic study on the Indian government they tend to give insight in the spatial and scalar hier-
archies and the bureaucratic embodiment produced by the state in the process of state spatial-
ization; the relation between spatial and statist orders and the way in which they produce one
another.⁴⁷ In their study the authors tend to provide insight in the conception and the imagi-
ary of the state and focus on the implicit, unmarked and signifying practices as much as on the
explicit discursive representations of the state.

Through the formalisation of the local informal structures the states tends to spatialise
the community residents. As the state has remained absent over the last decades, alternative
rules and local laws emerged in the communities, controlled by the drugs traffickers.⁴⁸ Resid-
ents often stressed how they were adapted to these rules and that the local laws used to func-
tion. Today, besides the several reports of abusive behaviour by the soldiers I elaborated upon
above, many of the residents of Alvorada complain that their liberty is being limited in terms
of the new rules they have to obey. For instance, the *baile funk* and the related informal local
economy of illegal music, informal beer and snacks vendors and local security (boys working
as security for the drugs gangs) have become criminalised. This used to be the primary form of
entertainment in the weekends, which means that streets have become very quiet during the
weekends. Residents now have to obtain an authorisation by the army when they want to or-
ganise a party, and usually they do not permit parties after two o’clock in the morning. Today,
parties mostly have to take place in indoor settings and drinks and foods vendors need a li-
cense. The prohibition of these parties not only takes away the entertainment of the youth, it
also profoundly impacts the local economy. As the *bailes* have stopped, the general movement
within the community has declined. This means a lot less work for *mototaxi* (motorcycle taxi)
drivers who used to take home the people from the parties. Also, the beer, soda and snacks
vendors miss a significant part of their income as consumption has decreased significantly.
But also, the beauty salons in the entire community have lost a large part of their clientele, as
most of the women came to do their hair or nails for the parties at Friday and Saturday. Be-
sides that, the women who used to spend most money in the salons were the girlfriends of the
*chefes* [drugs traffickers, high in the hierarchy], of whom most have moved to other not (yet)
pacified favelas. Whereas in normal salons in Brazil it is impossible to get your nails done on
Friday or Saturday, in the salon in Alvorada it was never a problem. At least, not after the occu-
pation. The owner of the salon complained that her turnover has problematically declined.

Besides the *bailes* many other services in the community used by the residents were or
still are informal. An example is the local transport system. This form of transport is the only
way, besides walking, to go up and down the hill and is used by almost all the residents. Hun-
dreds of vans and *mototaxis* circulate through the community transporting residents within
and to outside the community. This means of transport is cheap, fast and efficient, and covers
most of the area (the *mototaxis* even enter the small alleys and stairs!). And although informal,
this transport system is very well organised. One of the *mototaxi* organisations took part in the
2011 community association elections. Until the ‘pacification’, the *mototaxi* drivers had to pay
a tax percentage of their earnings to the traffickers. This means that even ‘hardworking and

⁴⁷ Ferguson & Gupta, 2002: 984.
honest residents’ in some way are involved in, or dependent on informality and, though indirectly, contribute financially to the illegal activities. One particular new rule contributing to the formalisation of the local transport is the inspection of the motorcycle taxi drivers’ documents, which most of them do not possess. At nights when I needed to go to the subway in Inhaúma, a neighbourhood near the community, I could hardly get a mototaxi that would want to bring me there. Down the hill there is a big chance to be inspected so mototaxi drivers avoid going there. Paulinho, a motorcycle taxi driver who uses to work at night, the period in which the soldiers inspect most, explained how these inspections seriously impact his work. Many nights he has to stay home because it has become impossible for him to work, which means no income and no money to pay the rent of his motorcycle. Let alone to save money to obtain his license in the near future.

They try to implement laws that do not benefit the community, they’re just imposing their power and new rules upon us. These kinds of law don’t improve the situation in the community! The drugs gangs imposed rules that had a particular function in the community, and therefore they were obeyed and defended by the residents. These laws aren’t. In this way they’ll never win the community’s support [Paulinho, personal communication, 12/06/2011].

Similar examples are the illegally liberated TV channels (gatonet) and Internet, water and electricity (tapped illegally from electricity wires), services that used to be free or at least very cheap. Today Light (the electricity company), Sky (TV and Internet), and a myriad of other companies enter to substitute the informality by the formal economy.

Many of these rules implemented by the state create new difficulties to overcome. Residents complain that their duties have arrived before their rights. Whereas the formalisation of the many informal structures and activities has begun, residents still lack access to a juridical body, proper health care, education, etc.

They impose new laws and rules while some people are starving [passa fome].

The way in which these changes are implemented causes a lot of discontent among the residents, resulting in a reinforced distrust in the state’s willingness to improve their socioeconomic conditions.

While the implementation of the state’s laws and rules would suggest an increased order, in fact many residents assure me that this has resulted in new forms of violence. Allegedly, the ‘rule of law’ that used to be existent in the favelas prohibiting theft and robbery was very strictly obeyed. Community residents could leave their doors unlocked and the windows wide open if they would leave the house, as no one would enter a resident’s house out of fear for punishment by the traffickers. Today, residents have neither the drugs traffickers nor a legal juridical body to address, resulting in several cases of robbery, theft and residents distrusting one another. Worse are increasingly emerging cases domestic violence and (sexual) abuse of women. The drugs gangs used to maintain a very strict policy in relation to sexual violence in

---

49 Getting a driver’s licence in Brazil is a very difficult, expensive and bureaucratic process. Most motorcycle drivers usually work only inside the community, where a licence has never been required. Suddenly they need these documents but many lack the financial means to obtain one.

50 Claudia, personal communication, 06/05/2011.
order to protect women. As according to several residents, no husband would beat his wife or he would be severely punished.

The hypocrisy of the formal

With the entrance of the state those old laws are replaced by the state’s ‘formal system’. The above suggests that two societies, a formal and an informal, exist next to each other. By informal I do not at all merely refer to drugs trafficking, but principally to the residents in general who manage to survive in informality. The motorcycle taxi driver who does not have a license, residents who do not pay gas, water and light nor TV and Internet, and so on. What is important to note is the ambiguity in the informal-formal dichotomy. While Ferguson & Gupta describe how the state’s spatialisation through bureaucratic processes is perceived by residents, they fail to address other factors that “keep people in their places”. Roberto DaMatta raises this important issue in his work Carnivals, Rogues and Heroes, An Interpretation of the Brazilian Dilemma. He points to the differentiation of equals and distinguishing individuals from persons. An individual is “the abstract entity for whom rules and repression were made”.51 It is the povo (people) or the ‘nobodies’ as opposed to the persons, the ‘someones’. That is, “the person deserves solidarity, hospitality and consideration—a special treatment.”52 An individual becomes or can become a person through social relations with particular other persons. DaMatta illustrates the difference between an individual and a person very clearly through the very commonly used phrase “Você sabe com quem você está falando?! (Do you know who you’re talking to?!), which is used when a person is treated as an individual, and thus feels that his authority is threatened. For instance, DaMatta gives the example of a parking lot attendant who tells a motorist there is no space available. When after insisting the motorist, who is actually an army officer, cannot get his parking space he asks: “Você sabe com quem você está falando?! I am army officer X!”53 It is in this way that this powerful phrase keeps people, and particularly the individuals, in their places.

These personal relationships maintain a hierarchy classifying not on the mere basis of economic differentiation but on other factors, namely, personal relations. In fact, DaMatta speaks of two codes: the “explicit written constitutional code, founded on the principles of equality and individualism, and an implicit, unwritten, hierarchical, complementary and ‘holistic’ moral code.”54 The reason why Brazilians use this ritual of social separation, DaMatta explains, seems to be the fact that it, different and disregarded by the universalistic classification provided by the economic sphere and the general (and ‘formal’) laws, decrees and rules of the state, allows and legitimises a classification based on social relations focussing on the person and provides a mechanism to establish or re-establish order and hierarchy.55 Beside the discursive act DaMatta points to in particular, the media fulfils an important role distinguishing between the ‘civilised’ areas and the ‘borderlands’, which is a way to keep the favela residents

---

51 DaMatta, 1991; 170.
52 DaMatta, 1991; 170.
53 DaMatta, 1991; 160.
54 DaMatta, 1991: 154
55 DaMatta, 1991: 149
56 DaMatta, 1991: 150
at distance not only on the basis of economic class, but through the ‘de-personalisation’ of relations with favela residents, framing them as mere individuals.

_Jeitinho_

Part of this characteristic of differentiation of equals is also the _Jeitinho Brasileiro_ (literally, the Brazilian way). DaMatta makes clear in his analysis that _persons_ are not always important (rich or powerful) people. An _individual_ can become a _person_ through identification with another _person_. Motorist of Deputy X can become a _person_ by saying: “Você sabe com quem está falando?! I’m the motorist of Deputy X!”, thus reaffirming his superiority over another individual. This is also more or less how the _jeitinho_ works. It is a strategic assessment of weighing the advantages or disadvantages of a particular place in the hierarchy in relation to the other and in this way it is hoped that the rule of law can be subverted. More specifically, it is a “last-minute way of accomplishing a goal by breaking a universalistic rule and using instead one’s informal social or personal resources”. Others have called it a survival strategy using one’s creativity to achieve a goal alternatively. The _jeitinho_ usually carries a fraudulent connotation and sometimes another person is losing out on your _jeitinho_. It is a ‘system’ of using and being used, an exchange of benefitting and being benefitted of by others.

Here, one can see the direct connection between the _jeitinho_ and the informality in the community, which should not merely be seen as an act of criminality but rather a survival strategy to circumvent the universalistic laws that have never really functioned in their local social structures. Saskia Sassen stresses that, when studying informality, no one makes the link with the “currently prevailing characteristics of the economy in general and large urban economies in particular”, which have an enormous impact on consumption patterns in cities and the organisation of work has evolved accordingly, partly informally. As she claims, “the shape of the informal economy changes according to the opportunities created and constraints imposed by the formal economy”, by which she means that the informal economy often complements the formal economy where the latter is lacking. Sassen gives the example of informal gipsy cabs in New York City serving the low-income communities as the regular cab drivers refuse to go there (and are much more expensive), which is illustrating for Complexo do Alemão as well. The criminalisation of these informal structures has already shown several difficulties, particularly in the economic sphere. I have not mentioned yet the removal of street stands selling all kinds of goods (fruits, clothes, jewellery, electronics, etc.) at Rua Joaquim Queiroz in Grota (one of the communities of Complexo do Alemão) as well. The criminalisation of these informal structures has already shown several difficulties, particularly in the economic sphere. I have not mentioned yet the removal of street stands selling all kinds of goods (fruits, clothes, jewellery, electronics, etc.) at Rua Joaquim Queiroz in Grota (one of the communities of Complexo do Alemão), or the replacement of a number of merchandisers to an indoor market that was built as a project to legalise their little shops. Formerly, they used to have a stand at the main street (near the entrance of Fazendinha) without a license but based on a mutual understanding on who possessed which area. A neighbouring vendor of _pão de queijo_ (cheese bread) who has not been replaced yet tells me

---

57 Yúdice, 2003: 68.
58 Lívia Barbosa in Yúdice, 2003: 68.
60 This is a phenomenon I described in my previous thesis. See: Sluis, 2010: 25.
61 Sassen, 1998, 167-168
63 Sassen, 1998: 162.
that he has been there for over fifteen years with no one taking his place. However, what nobody took into account was the fact that the flux of people in this indoor area was basically zero, resulting in the bankruptcy of the majority of the shops. These examples show how the informality and the jeitinho are in direct conflict with the impersonality and universality of the formal law.

What it comes down to is that the implementation of the ‘formal’, or rather, universalistic laws, decrees and rules based on equality and individualism by the state is a very ambiguous practice, as in the Brazilian society persons can go around the law through the complicated norms based on a web of imperative social relations. These rules are created by persons, to whom other rules are valid and who usually not follow the law. In the community, relations among residents are much more based on a personal network rather than on the individual. What happens today with the state’s attempt to ‘formalise’ these informal structures, is in fact the state’s attempt to spatialise the favela and to claim this territory. As DaMatta explains; the rules and repression that are made to maintain order among the individuals and hierarchy in society. In this way, the implementation of the universal laws, rules and decrees is inherently a process of power.

**Everyday forms of resistance**

An illustrating song touching upon the issue of informal life and ‘in-betweenness’ is Paralelo by resident and musician and composer Eddu Grau, who aims to provide a critical note to society through his songs. ‘In-betweenness’ is what characterises Latin American societies, where hierarchies can be subverted through social processes. ‘In-between’ are thus the cultures which are neither universal nor personal/informal, but rather both universal and personal/informal. Paralelo refers to his life as a community resident in between criminality and legality, as both are unaccountable as well as repressive. He has to find his way to survive in this parallel world, parallel to the state (legality) and the drugs traffickers (his parallel does not refer to this parallel power, but of course this confusing element emphasises the complexity of all the structures).

**Arrumo um jeito de comprar meu pão**

*Sem ter um salário*

*Ter no seu lamento um bom motivo pra compor*

*Gastar meu sossego, me frustrar bem cedo sem tomar café*

*E nos seus palavrões encontrar gírias que dizem me amar*

---

**I find a way to buy my bread**

*Without getting a pay check*

*Having in your lament is a good reason to compose*

*I spend my leisure, frustrating myself early, without having breakfast [coffee]*

---

64 DaMatta, 1991: 168, emphasis mine.
65 DaMatta, 1991, 183.
And in your cursing words I find slang that says it loves me

The song stresses the ambiguity of life and especially his financial difficulties. Without getting a pay check, as unemployment is common, he manages to buy bread; not stealing. He finds a way. The last three phrases emphasise the hate-love relationship with life. Even in the bad things there can be found good things, but you are on your own and you have to take care of it yourself.

Overall, residents have a deeply rooted distrust towards the state after decades of violent repression, racial exclusion and absence in terms of public services. This feeling seems reinforced through the way in which the state enters the community. A general claim is that there is no interaction or communication with the residents on the way in which changes are applied whatsoever. Others more radically claim that a local system that used to function is now replaced by rules and laws that have an opposite effect. Instead of increasing justice, socio-economical inclusion, order and security the implementation of these formal rules cause chaos, a sense of insecurity and new socio-economic difficulties for the residents. What struck me was that people complained, but did not take any action in order to make their voice heard or demand an active role in decision-making processes. In Alvorada I could not see much overt forms of resistance, organisation or mobilisation. However, rather than assuming that this would mean that people were satisfied and complained just because someone was (finally) listening to them, instead I found that there were other, subtle and hidden ways in which people resisted against the ‘pacification’ process. One of the first things that came to the fore in my analysis is that while residents often complain about the new difficulties through the implementation of the state’s rules and laws, most of the criticism is projected onto the soldiers.

Scapegoating the soldiers

Through the physical presence of the army, the residents often perceive the ‘pacification’, and the changes that come with it, as a direct result of the acts by the soldiers. Rather than holding the state, the governor or the president responsible, it is the soldiers who receive the credits and much more often the criticism by the residents. While the soldiers are mere puppets fulfilling their part in the bureaucratic system of the state (remember here the complexity of the Brazilian ‘system’ as described by DaMatta), residents see them as their enemy more than the elite, who are the ones directing them. While the army functions in the lowest scale of the state’s vertical encompassment, as described by Ferguson & Gupta, the state is not seen as an entity above them.

The army resides in the community but hardly interacts with the residents. They strictly watch the residents and the latter pretend they are not there. Most of the residents refuse to greet them and only say the necessary, for instance when they are inspected. I remember the first day I visited the community. I had never entered a favela of Rio de Janeiro before, nor had

67 The occupation of Complexo do Alemão through the army, different than the favelas that are occupied by the UPP (Pacification Police) which is a project by the Rio de Janeiro state government, is a partnership between the state and federal government.
I see a rifle—or rather, so many rifles—in my life. While residents often tell me how they are relieved that now there are no longer weapons in the community (referring to the drugs traffickers who no longer walk around armed), I could only see these soldiers with their rifles, proudly holding it in front of their chests. What scared me most, however, was the fact that they did not interact. They looked at me, followed me for a while at three meters distance, but they did not say anything. In the following months, at times when walking around with residents, we were inspected. At these moments, they only say the necessary, often in a very abusive and disrespectful way.

When asking a couple of soldiers about this they answered that they were ordered to maintain the residents at distance. Too much interaction is prohibited, as I would lead to complex situations in which residents would not be able to make the distinction between an authority and a friend (although an exception is made when they flirt and go out with the girls). Through the creation of a division between the soldiers and the community residents, it is avoided that they interact, and thus, understand each other. While some argue that this is done to prevent soldiers involvement in criminal practices—as often was the case with the military police who usually took bribes for allowing trafficking—it also maintains a rigid barrier between the troops and the residents, the former repressing rather than protecting the latter. While the state and federal government are responsible for the occupation, responses by the residents are primarily seen in relation to the presence of or directed towards the soldiers.

Irritating the soldiers

I was amused when I heard residents referring to the soldiers as periquito (parakeet) or abacate (avocado), because of their green uniforms. It is a form of teasing and making fun of them. The soldiers use (and often abuse) their authority not only to dominate or control the favela residents, but also to differentiate themselves from the ‘poor’ and the favelado, as both are often from the same socioeconomic class. The residents themselves have little means of resistance against this authority they do not respect (and who does not respect them). I see the teasing as a way to devalue and satirize their authority, and in this way a subtle form of ‘resistance’. James Scott has introduced the concept of everyday forms of peasant resistance, which are practices of (peasant) resistance that involve no overt protest and require little or no organisation. These practices are overlooked by many of us looking for forms of organisation, collective identity and broad purposes. These “everyday forms of resistance” are “[...]any kind of act by a peasant that intended either to mitigate or deny claims (e.g. rents, taxes, corvée, deference) made on that class by superordinate classes (e.g. landlords, the state, moneylenders) or to advance peasant claims (e.g. to land, work, charity, respect) vis-à-vis these superordinate classes.” Viewing resistance from this angle, Scott believes that most forms of peasant resistance do not fit within the standard definition of social movements, such as described by e.g. Tilly and Tarrow, and therefore we must observe and recognise “the or-

---

68 Soldier, personal communication, 21/03/2011.
71 Scott, 1987: 419
72 See: Tilly and Tarrow, 2006.
Several of these ordinary weapons I found in refusing to interact with the soldiers and disobedient behaviour. An example is the invasion of the swimming pool of the Colégio Jornalista Tim Lópes, a public high school. Since the inauguration of the school in September 2010 the pool has not yet been used, due to a lack of lifeguards and teachers. Residents have demolished the fence, and while the soldiers of the previous battalion (they change every three months) used to keep the pool under strong surveillance, the new troops are failing. During my stay I saw the residents, particularly kids and youngsters, of the nearby apartments seeking some refreshment in the pool. Boys stay on the lookout for soldiers, as the latter will punish them.

Also, residents, mostly male adolescents, smoke marijuana on the streets. When soldiers pass by they hide, or quickly put out their joint. One of them tells me how he likes to smoke marijuana on his laje (rooftop).

These days the army has placed a camera at the cable car station near my house, which captures my rooftop. When I smoke I am in front of the camera. I don’t mind being recorded, I am not going to change my habits inside my home!74

Formerly, using drugs was liberated by the drugs gangs’ laws, so many residents used to consume several kinds of drugs on the streets; mostly marijuana. Today, drugs consumption is prohibited and combated by the soldiers. Through continuing smoking marijuana these adolescents demonstrate that they refuse to obey the rules imposed by the new authority.

Smoking [pod] is like the last protest against the state. It’s like saying: “you won’t take this away from me!”75

---

73 Scott, 1987: 419.
74 Fernando, personal communication, 16/05/2011.
75 Emerson, personal communication, 02/06/2011.
However, I felt that it is not their prior intention to show the soldiers their disobedience, as they would be punished immediately. Rather, it is a form of resistance through which they demonstrate to themselves and among one another that they refuse to give up their old habits.

Another form of protest I see in *pichação* (cryptic style tagging, mainly on walls and buildings). Throughout the entire community there are phrases such as *Diga não a UPP* (Say No to the UPP), *Qual mentira vou acreditar* (Which lie I’m gonna believe), and numerous ‘C.V’-s. A particular example is the naming of the five cable car stations that are built in Complexo do Alemão. Each station is located at a particular *morro* (hill) and usually gets the name of that area. The station in Alvorada is located at Coqueiro, the afore mentioned square that any resident knows by this name. Recently, a sign with the text *Estação Itararé* (Itararé Station) was placed in front of the station. While the station is practically on top of the hill, Itararé is the name of the street down the hill, and forms the division between the favela and the *asfalto*. According to residents this is not just mistake by the PAC functionaries but a deliberate decision:

Here is not Itararé, Itararé is down the hill [lá em baixo]. This place, Coqueiro, has a rather negative connotation for them [the people from outside the community/elite] because here used to be a lot of clashes with the police. But for us Itararé doesn’t make sense, here is Coqueiro and everybody knows

---

76 Abbreviation of Comando Vermelho, the drugs faction that used to dominate he Complexo do Alemão.
The PAC (the state) tends to claim its territory through the naming of this station as Estação Itararé, the name of a place that is outside the favela. In this way they tend to mitigate a negative connotation of a place within the favela with a name from outside. However, residents have quickly demonstrated their discontent through the marking of this sign with plenty of scratches and ‘C.V.s’.

DaMatta recognises violence or violent acts as “a fundamental mechanism to transform individuals into persons”. He gives the example of vandalism and deconstruction in means of mass transportation, where people are in between their houses (where they are persons in their family and neighbourhood) and, for instance, their work (where they have similar personal relations with colleagues and the boss) and thus, like any other, an individual. Individuais, who are invisible, the nobodies, become visible through a violent or criminal act, thus transforming oneself into a person. In this light, another noteworthy case is a group of adolescents and teenagers, mostly boys, who take the cable car—now that access is still free—to mess around. When in the cars they mark the windows (pichação), make it shake and scream and yell loudly when they pass over the houses and the streets. From up there they know the soldiers can hear them, but from the streets the latter cannot reach nor recognise them. In this light I would see their behaviour as a cry for attention. An act to transform oneself from an invisible individual into a person. In all these examples the residents mitigate and deny the claims of the soldiers, although ‘claims’ in this case are less ‘material’ and would instead refer to rules and decrees.

Resistance or survival?

Mid June 2011, seven months after the occupation, I joined two residents of the community to watch a movie. “Let’s see which movie is passing on TV, now that the gatonet has returned!” The gatonet used to be the illegally liberated TV channels, which provided free access to over 200 private TV channels to the community. After the occupation in November 2010 the gatonet was shut down and for the first time residents had to start paying to watch private TV channels. This caused a lot of discontent among the residents, as a contract with Sky, the TV company, is unaffordable for most of the residents. While governor Sergio Cabral has promised to provide packages from only R$25,00 (normal price would be over R$100,00 which is almost one fifth of the minimum salary), residents are tired of waiting for promises to become

---

77 Rodrigo, personal communicaton, 10/06/2011.
79 DaMatta, 1991: 193.
reality. So residents decided to take action themselves and started to liberate several channels. This is done through capturing a particular channel and re-transmitting it throughout the community. While formerly this occured centrally, with a few people responsible group-wise, today the transmitters are dispersed among the community in order to assure anonymity. At the time of writing residents could freely watch four private channels.

While it would be romantic to see the return of the *gatonet* as a form of resistance; a protest against the formalisation and the entrance of the market, in fact this circumvention of the legal structures is a form of survival. I learned that the people behind the illegal transmissions—which are likely to be people with a history in criminal activities—return to this job as a (or the only) way to generate an income. Ex-traffickers with a criminal record face severe prejudgets from society and therefore hardly find a job in the formal sector (*carteira assinada*). The only way to make a living is to find some kind of informal job such as *mototaxi* or van driver, or, in this case, liberating private channels which allows them to charge (although little) the residents in order to sustain themselves. As Scott notes: "The goal, after all, of the great bulk of [peasant] resistance is not to overthrow or transform a system of domination but rather to survive."

**Nostalgia in uncertain times**

What shocked me in the first place and still strikes me is the radicalism with which the adolescents would explicitly wish that the drugs traffickers would return. More understandable are the milder complaints of the residents about the new rules and laws that complicate their lives. Although I cannot verify the correctness or truth of statements such as "it used to be better", "the law really functioned" and "no man would beat his wife", they do reflect a certain longing for the past, a feeling of nostalgia. The illustrative title of Zygmunt Bauman's work *Liquid Times* clearly reflects the feeling of insecurity of the present and uncertainty of the future of (urban) citizens in a globalising world. The era in which state subsidised public services become increasingly privatised and in which the market gains more and more power create many difficulties and instability for, particularly, the economically weak. Besides that, individualism tears apart safe community structures.

In a world where disengagement is practiced as a common strategy of the power struggle and self-assertion, there are few if any firm points in life that can be safely predicted to last. The ‘present’ does not therefore bind the ‘future’, and there is nothing in the present that allows us to guess, let alone visualize, the shape of things to come.

In relation to this, DaMatta writes that in tribal communities or small villages the social relations are based on personal relationships rather than individual structures. The bonds with the family and the neighbourhood are strong and in this environment people are *persons* rather than *individuals*. The same goes for the family. When one grows up and at one point needs to leave this network of personal relationships in order to enter ‘the real world’ (for work or school for instance), this is likely to cause a feeling of insecurity. For many of the

---

83 Bauman and Vecchi, 2004: 68.
84 DaMatta, 1991: 183.
community residents there is a strong division between the community and the *asfalto*, and not only in physical terms. This comes very clearly to the fore in the following example: after the occupation a lot of traffickers have fled to other favelas, others still or again are involved in trafficking in Complexo do Alemão, and others are trying to sustain themselves in another way. A young man called Emerson, who used to be a trafficker tells me how, since he quit shortly after the occupation, he feels trapped. “It feels like I don't have any space, I have lost my mobility.” He used to have a lot of money to spend when he was a trafficker, but after the occupation he started to sell *Açaí*, a frozen fruit shake, and makes just enough money to survive; to pay the bills and to take care of his wife and two kids. Money gave him space to move, to do things, to go to other places, and to buy things. The space this man talks about, however, is not unlimited, and not only created or limited by *money*. When talking to other boys who still make some money trafficking drugs in the community I could see that this space they feel they have is still very limited to a space in which they feel comfortable. They have the money to go downtown to fancy clubs, but they will not go there because they feel they do not belong there. One night I invited one of my friends of the group of adolescents in Alvorada to go to a concert of a rapper in Madureira, a middle and lower middle class neighbourhood in the *Zona Norte* (Northern part) of the city. I insisted, knowing that they usually do not leave the community unless they go to a *baile funk* in other favelas. He then responded “Don't you get it that we don't want to go there?” I realised that ‘there’ meant the *asfalto*, that club, or that *society*. These adolescents circulate through the city but remain within the spaces in which they ‘belong’. They are not ‘trapped’ in the limited space of the state’s bureaucratic system the lower classes experience, as in the case of Emerson, or as demonstrated by Ferguson & Gupta, but they circulate in the spaces where the state is absent.

Apparently, in their network of personal relationships status and money plays an important role. Also, their (good) relationships with others, for instance *chefes*, renders them a form of respect in these spaces. What happens today is that the existent network based on personal relationships is being ‘invaded’ by the impersonality of the soldiers. A society based on personal relationships now mixes with a society based on individuality as universal rules and laws are being applied. I already put a quote of a resident claiming that they do not know the difference between a resident and a bandit. Residents used to know the traffickers personally, even though in some cases mixed with fear: Their relation with the soldiers is not only very distant and impersonal, but also, residents feel no longer like *persons*, as they are treated by them as *individuals*.

**Different voices**

For many community residents who lived closely together or who were (indirectly) involved in drugs trafficking the entrance of the state has caused a lot of impact. They have entered in a rather complex situation in which their former informal reality is now being replaced by the rules and decrees of the state. Simultaneously, the control of the parallel power persists, though in another—rather silent and hidden—form.

The struggle over power is not merely related to physical space. As the above demon-
strates, the entrance of the army in this territory has not automatically led to the legitimacy of the new authority by the community. This rather depends on the former degree of the residents’ involvement with the drugs traffickers. Those residents who used to live closely together with the drugs traffickers usually express more negative opinions or distrust towards the soldiers than other residents, for instance parents of young children, members of the Evangelical church or people who live near the asfalto. Even though the state is now ‘present’ in the community, ‘inclusion’ (in terms of social inclusion, citizenship) is a concept that is different for particular groups of residents. There are immense differences between the religious, those who work and thus spend most time outside the favela, those who live up the hill, those who are closely involved in trafficking, and so forth. Just as explains Appadurai, the production of locality should be seen as a constant struggle between actors, which can be the state as well as the still present drugs gangs to dominate certain groups. Thus, locality is not necessarily tied to a place, or a geographical territory but functions on different scales. This helps understand why some residents in the same occupied territory, or even living next to each other, are ‘in favour’ or ‘against’.

In this light, an important last factor to address is fear. Not all residents show support, or a form of nostalgia to the drugs traffickers and the past times. The legitimacy the traffickers built applies only to part of the population of the community. Resident Eddu Grau tells me that over the years an often addressed social contract with the drugs gangs has been replaced by a capitalist and consumerist ideology. One evening two boys of the group of adolescents I often talked with showed me the Orkut[^85] profile of the former *chefé*. This man had posted about fifty photos showing himself, his wife and two kids in the age between two and four years old. On each photo all of them (the kids too!) wore incredibly thick golden necklaces, watches, rings, and so on. The boys assured me that these necklaces are worth over R$200,000 ($100,000) and apparently the *chefé* possessed several. The ostentatious wealth (gold, diamantes, expensive cars and motorcycles, designer clothing) has distracted the traffickers’ attention from the social problems of the community. Eddu Grau gives the example of funk music that used to talk about the state’s violence and in a way to resist against the state that treated them, the community residents, as garbage, but how over the years this changed.

Those who in a way used to protect us now started to threaten us, as funk became an instrument of coercion and control of the masses. Concluding: We found ourselves in danger from one side [the state or police] as much as the other [the traffickers]...

He continues explaining that in this way the traffickers are losing their legitimacy towards the community residents. Ironically he wonders what the MCs would talk about now that they are no longer the Robin Hoods of the favela:

Talking about a guy becoming a millionaire while his neighbours are starving? Or about how good crack is? Or that a rifle is so cool, and costs R$ 30,000, which is the dream of so many people who want to buy a house?[^86]

In this way, the drugs traffickers built a form of legitimacy that is based not on a mutual un-

[^85]: Google’s social networking site.
[^86]: Eddu Grau, interview, 16/08/2011.
derstanding of the social contract, but on fear.\footnote{See: Zaluar, 1994.}

The production of locality is closely related to power and legitimacy, and can be produced through respect but also through fear and control. Rather than producing this could instead be seen as ‘enforcing’ locality. For instance, many girls think the soldiers are beautiful, or at least interesting. However, they cannot express this interest because they are afraid of the traffickers. I have heard women telling stories about girls who date soldiers and are punished. Also, residents refuse to interact with the soldiers because the day the traffickers retain their power they will be charged for their sympathy with the ‘enemy’. In a beauty salon I asked if soldiers sometimes come to get a manicure.\footnote{In Brazil it is not unusual for men to get a manicure.} The owner answered: “I don’t want any soldiers in my salon!” Another girl told me when she was at a forró (a party with particular music) having a conversation with a guy when he told her that he got a weekend off from the barracks. “I thought, my god, he’s a soldier! But then I found out that he was from the navy, so it wasn’t that bad.” Often it even looks like a doctrine. When I asked girls if they like the soldiers they immediately answer “No! Not at all!”, which is a very generalizing answer as it is practically impossible to not like at least one of them. They no longer see persons behind the uniform of the soldier, and instead see them as an entity. And they have learned to dislike this entity. This does not mean that they are not relieved that the drugs traffickers have lost (part of) their power. However, fear outweighs legality; residents prefer to not choose the side of legality, as history has proven that the state’s interventions have never lasted, and thus, that there is a good chance the drugs traffickers come back.

\textit{The consumption of fear}

I want to briefly mention another factor that is contributing to the increasing feeling of insecurity of the community residents. I already mentioned how a global (western) elite and the media respond to a feeling of insecurity by inciting fear through the creation of an enemy, a danger: the underdeveloped world, and poverty.\footnote{See: Bauman, 2007, but also: Duffield, 2007.} This happens in Brazil too; the mainstream media (big media companies such as Globo) frame the favela as a source of violence and unrest. The entire day sensationalist images of violence, murder, theft, kidnapping, trafficking and gunfire pass, instigating fear on middle class cariocas, but also on the proper community residents, who, ironically, themselves inhabit the places that are framed so negatively. This fear-mongering increasingly leads to people staying inside the house to hide from the dangerous world outside, to watch more TV, and in this way being exposed to even more terrifying information. What struck me was the fact that often residents warned me that it was so unsafe in the community, while I never felt uncomfortable. Unlike these scared residents, others assured me that the community was the safest place for me to be, as in other parts of the city, like downtown, I would easily be robbed or assaulted, while in the community everybody knew me and would respect me. While the latter are more sceptical, the former applaud the ‘pacification’ as the presence of the soldiers has indeed led to a decrease of violence, and they do feel liberated. In general, the youth and young adolescents have most difficulty with the entrance
of the soldiers, as their lives are most radically impacted. Families, on the other hand, are relieved that a chance of their kids involving in drugs trafficking is now minimal. But as I have tried to demonstrate in this chapter, the ‘pacification’ entails much more than the mere substitution of the drugs traffickers by the soldiers. The continuous lack of proper education, health care and social equity in general, reinforced by the top down and non-interactive way in which the ‘pacification’ project is implemented causes discontent among residents.

**Conclusion**

Locality and a feeling of belonging are being fought over by a number of actors and subject to profound changes. On the surface it appears to be a struggle between the state and the drugs traffickers who used to maintain power, but the situation turns out to be more complex. As community life has developed autonomously over the past decades and informal structures have emerged that fit the local way of life, the universality of the laws, rules and decrees by the state do not take into account this local reality. Moreover, the formalisation of these informal structures is rather ambiguous, as the Brazilian society is based not only on the universal rule of law, but also on an alternative system of discursive practices that help to keep people in their places.

The new laws and rules create more difficulties rather than easing the life of the community residents. This hampers the process of state spatialization as residents, often in order to survive, need to find ways to circumvent these structures. Also, residents express resistance in subtle ways, through teasing the soldiers. Acts of vandalism are more direct forms of protest, although not often communicating a clear message. Rather, I understand these as a call for attention and recognition. Like DaMatta sees it: acts to transform oneself from an individual into a person.

The many changes of the ‘pacification’ cause a strong feeling of nostalgia among many residents, longing back to the times before the occupation. When the rules of the game change, residents are left in a state of uncertainty. At the same time, however, the ‘maintenance’ of locality by the drugs traffickers, who are still present although in a more hidden form, is primarily based on fear. Drugs traffickers had already lost part of their legitimacy and retain ‘power’ through the instigation of fear among residents who show a positive attitude toward the soldiers. This means that most residents find themselves in-between two oppressive powers an increasingly turn to themselves, their family structures, and the church, waiting to see what will come. Last but not least, the market is entering this territory hand in hand with the state, but among most residents considered more neutral and not directly recognised as another actor in the fight over territory. To this I will turn in the following chapter.
CHAPTER 2: The Favela goes Global, Coca Cola goes Local

I feel that the ideological ‘wall’ dividing our community from the rest of the society is disappearing.
And we want to continue working on this.90

O que vale é ter liberdade para consumir, essa é a verdadeira funcionalidade da democracia.91

While the previous chapter focused on the profound changes the entrance of the state and the criminalisation of the informal structures have caused on the everyday life of the community residents, this chapter shows how the ‘pacification’ has opened doors for a youth movement. Since the day of the invasion in November 2010 the eyes of the whole country, or perhaps the whole world, are focused on the Complexo do Alemão. The favela that used to be considered the most dangerous of Complexo do Alemão is now ‘pacified’, allowing for an alternative image of the community to be constructed. The youngsters of Complexo do Alemão are working to de-stigmatize the favela and to tear down an imaginary wall that used to surround their community.

Simultaneously, there is an increased interest from outside actors (public, private and non-profit). While the community used to be almost inaccessible—or at least, it used to be considered inaccessible—today a myriad of civil society organisations, institutions, companies and public institutions want to enter the community. The territory of a parallel power and an informal society is now becoming the playground of different actors who are all claiming this space in a particular way. Rather than seeing the ‘pacification’ as the entrance of the state, we should recognise the state-market annex in this process, and the entrance by NGOs. All these different actors together constitute a new form of power that could be defined the concept of the neoliberal state.92

This chapter analyses a newly emerging relation between civil society and the state through new digital communication technologies and globalisation, and how this affects the process of territoriality after the entrance of these new actors in the community. First I will introduce the case of a group of adolescents who use the Internet and mobile phones both to

90 Nathalia, personal communication, 26/05/2011.
91 A quote by actor Lázaro Ramos in the movie “Quanto Vale ou é Por Quilo” by Sergio Bianchi, 2005. Freely translated: What counts is liberty to consume, that is the true functionality of democracy. Bianchi draws an analogy between the ancient slave trade and the contemporary exploitation of misery/poverty by social marketing. The movie provides a strong criticism to the NGO sector and its fund raising in collaboration with the government and private sector. Read more: http://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quanto_Vale_ou_%C3%89_por_Quilo%3F
92 See: Ferguson & Gupta, 2002.
disseminate information and to articulate to actors outside the community. Secondly and contrarily, I will analyse how these outside actors use these youngsters to enter the community and to promote their social responsibility. Both cases will demonstrate how the community residents and actors from outside are situated in a complex web of articulations and interactions, which radically transform traditional notions of space and favela identity in the community.

Rene Silva and Voz da Comunidade

Rene Silva is a seventeen-year-old boy from Morro do Adeus; one of the communities of Complexo do Alemão. He became famous all over the world in November 2010 when he reported on the invasion of the community by the military police using Twitter.\(^{93}\) As the press was not allowed to enter the community during the invasion, big (international) media companies, such as Globo, BBC and CNN, started to focus on this boy, using the information of his tweets in news items and even translating his tweets into English. Ever since, the number of followers of his Twitter account has risen to over 56,000 at the moment of writing.

At the time of the invasion, Rene was not coincidentally using Twitter to report on the events. In fact he already used to edit a community journal called Voz da Comunidade (Voice of the Community) together with two friends, Gabriela (14) and Renato (13). They had just started to use Twitter in addition to the print journal to disseminate news throughout the community. In an interview with Globo Rene clarifies:

> I am where the press doesn't enter. And, when they come, they show the community for those who are outside. I want to show what we have here to the proper community.\(^{94}\)

An important detail is the fact that Rene and his friends live in Morro do Adeus, which is a hill located on the other side of an asphalted street (Estrada Itararé) and, different than the other eleven communities of the Complexo do Alemão, occupied by a rival drugs gang, the ADA (Amigos dos Amigos). This means that both geographically, but also ideologically, it used to be seen as separated from the other twelve communities of the Complexo do Alemão. In a public discussion\(^{95}\) Rene explained how this would hamper their access to ‘the other side’, let alone their awareness of events occurring in the other eleven communities and their familiarity with the residents and their daily lives. Also, the community journal was not distributed throughout the entire community. According to Gabriela, the usually 5000 editions were mostly read by the residents of Morro do Adeus.\(^{96}\)

Whilst Rene was already active on Twitter before November 2010, it was during the invasion and after that big media companies have increasingly fixated on Rene as the representative of the group. Suddenly, the community journal, which had transformed in a digital ver-

---

93 http://twitter.com/#!/vozdacomunidade
95 During a cinema event by Cine Telabrazil in Complexo do Alemão/Casinhas at 31/05/2011.
96 Gabriela, personal communication, 30/03/2011.
sion started to function as a tool to inform the outside world about ‘everyday life’ in the community rather than for community communication. Also, Rene became an icon and is often approached by journalists and the media for news items and interviews. One of his tweets says:

A Globo journalist called me to talk about a reportage and asked me if I play Habbo Hotel [a game] as well. Her son also plays it.97

When events take place in the community, or outside the community relating to relevant topics (such as favela journalism, the favela, the pacification, etc.), Rene is usually invited. For instance, he was a judge in the final of the Favela Festival, an American Idols-like festival promoting musical talent in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro (see chapter 3). Also, companies, and particularly media conglomerate Globo, sponsor him and his activities. Globo, for instance, donated chocolate eggs for a campaign called PAZcoa No Alemão98 organised by Rene.99 During another event, the Corrida da Paz (Peace Run), Coca Cola has established a partnership with Rene and Voz da Comunidade, who would transmit in real time on Twitter about the event.100

Online voices from the communities

In April 2011 Rene launched a new initiative called Voz das Comunidades101 (Voice of the Communities). It is an online news portal about a number of favelas in Rio de Janeiro, including Complexo do Alemão. While Rene and his team will be the final editors of the portal, each community will have a local reporter to cover the favelas journalistically.102 Until today there is no official sponsor and the work is done voluntarily, though there are some rumours that Coca Cola wants to contribute financially to the portal.

It is very interesting how these youngsters have integrated their former work on community communication into this portal connecting communities all over the city. They have added a Facebook and Twitter application to the portal importing their latest tweets and updates, thus importing their online social network into this news site. Visitors are logged into Facebook or Twitter when retweeting or liking the articles on the portal, thus distributing the information via their profiles of their social networking sites. In this way, the portal connects an already existing and growing network of people interested or living in Rio’s favelas. Moreover, many people actively discuss relevant topics and these discussions appear on the portal.

An interesting discussion that appeared at the time of writing addressed an intervention by the army at a party. Soldiers came to close down a party in a non-pacified area (Morro do...
Adeus) without, as according to the Tweeters present at the party, any clear reason. The organisers of the party got authorisation until two o’clock in the morning but, even though there was no turmoil, fighting or violence, the army shut down the party around one o’clock (see figure 1).

The Tweeters involved in the discussion raise issues such as the absence of the soldiers when ‘necessary’ and their presence when it comes to entertainment (see figure 2). As one of

Figure 1: Twitter conversation on the closing down of the party at Clube Paranhos at 17/07/2011.

Lanadsouza: The event was until 2. No one knows why it stopped. Remembering that there wasn’t any unrest. Nothing impeded the event to stop; Vozdacomunidade: This brings more disunion in the community with the pacification forces. Culture in the community is no longer permitted?; Vozdacomunidade: Why can the other clubs can function until the morning and a indoor event has to stop when they want to? @exercitooficial; Vozdacomunidade: We should remember that there wasn’t any fight and the event was authorised to continue until 2 in the morning. Without mentioning that the event was indoor; Vozdacomunidade: The event at Clube Paranhos has ended right now, because the pacification forces have just told to stop the party!
them writes:

[...]we cannot forget that there were also a van and several cars stolen, and they are never present, [...] [but] when it is to end with the entertainment and messing around with the workers of the communities they are always present. 103

They claim that the community culture is discriminated (A cultura da comunidade não pode mais?) and the poor in general. A girl (@biatassen) states that “they must think that the poor shouldn’t have fun” (pobre não pode se divertir, é o q eles devem achar!). The topic is not only discussed among these youngsters, they also direct their claims to the army (@exercitoooficial) and make their statement clear. Later that day, @vozadacomunidade posts that it turned out to be the fault of the organisers, because the army had only given permission for the party until midnight. In this post the army was again included to make sure they would receive this message as well. In a way, Voz da Comunidade, with Rene as its representative, takes on the role of mediator, or a personality of the community, rather than a mere journalist.

**Descolando Ideias**

Similar to and closely collaborating with Rene, there is a group of adolescents and young adults actively using new media in order to communicate about their community to the outside world. Descolando Ideias (literally: ‘separating’ ideas: explaining, sifting through ideas) reports on events taking place in the community, actualities and the local reality, providing a different and more positive image of the favela than the mainstream media, which usually covers only the negativity and often in a very sensationalist way. Moreover, as they work mainly digitally, they aim at encouraging the community residents to enter the digital era. Whereas today Orkut and MSN are still the main social networking sites, Facebook and Twitter are quickly gaining interest among the residents. Particularly at the public school Colégio Jornalista Tim Lópes, where Rene studies, a lot of students told me that they already have a Facebook account. Finally, and most importantly, they work as articulators between the community and interested actors from outside.

We are a group circulating through the community in order to observe, get to know people, their necessities, and to participate in the society in which we live. The street is our office. 104

This quote clearly describes what they actually do. Several times I joined them during walks through the community. One day, for instance, they took the streets to distribute flyers to announce a party they had organised. The party would be a way to gather money for the continuation of their activities, as they all work voluntarily. For the distribution of the flyers they had invited me and another friend, who had never visited the community before. All together, we circulated through the community chatting with residents, talking about the party, and, importantly, taking numerous photos, which they later posted on their Facebook account report-

---

103 @galoboladao, Twitter,18/07/2011.
104 Freely translated: Descolando Ideias bio on Twitter: [http://twitter.com/#!/DescolandoIdeia](http://twitter.com/#!/DescolandoIdeia). [original: “Somos um grupo que circula pela favela observando, conhecendo as pessoas,suas necessidades e participação na sociedade em que vivem,a rua é o nosso escritório.”]
ing on this day. Also, during our walk, they tweeted every once in a while about our experiences of that afternoon.

Such a walk is interesting in itself, but also led to several other events and ideas. For instance, it served to distribute the flyers, but simultaneously it was a ‘test-drive’ for a tour na favela (favela tour) they want to start up in order to get people from other favelas or from outside of the community to get to know their daily reality. Moreover, when we passed by a bar at the corner of a narrow alley, they noticed a parked Coca Cola car, which almost blocked the entrance of the alley. Immediately they went after the owner of the car, not to ask him to remove his car, but to see if they could arrange a partnership with or some kind of financial support from Coca Cola. Although this did not result in anything concrete that day, it demonstrates very clearly how they operate. They are always alert to find opportunities and to develop and elaborate ideas, as the name of the group already indicates. Much more than reporters, they try to interact with both the community and outside actors, in order to articulate and to establish links. Nathalia, one of the collaborators of the group, explained me:

We have decided that we don’t want to be journalists. We don’t want to focus so much on communicating actualities to media companies, Rene already does that. Instead, we prefer to serve the community by articulating projects from outside of the community, but also private companies that want
Descolando Ideias has recognised and interesting and important role for themselves as articulator between the community and the many companies that are entering. As according to Nathalia companies such as Coca Cola and Nike have realised that the classes D and C form

Nathalia, interview, 26/05/2011.

See for an overview of the different socioeconomic classes in Brasil developed by the Departamento Intersindical.
the biggest group of consumers of their products, which makes the favela a very interesting market for them. Especially after the ‘pacification’ these companies increasingly arrive in the community. For instance, over the past year three private banks have opened branches (Santander, Bradesco and Itaú, though the latter has yet to be inaugurated at the time of writing).

What misses in our community is people’s awareness of the services and products these companies serve. Not only in terms of products, but also in terms of opportunities for the residents, such as jobs, for instance, for which they can apply. But also to inform people about the arrival of a new bank. Because many people still go to Ramos [nearby neighbourhood] to pay a bill, while they can now do it here, down the street!¹⁰⁷

In the case of Descolando Ideias the Internet serves as a powerful tool to articulate to those actors. Nathalia explains how they do their work mostly via Twitter. They find other interesting companies and organisations to collaborate, and they are found by these companies and organisations as well.

It’s incredible how you get in touch with people you don’t know, or who you otherwise wouldn’t have known. It’s like networking but it starts digitally. It’s very powerful!¹⁰⁸

The networking Nathalia describes radically changes their perception of space in the community, to which I will turn now.

Networking, scaling, territory.

Neoliberalism has become the normal condition under which we live. As the previous chapter already examined, the neoliberal ideologies of freedom and liberty have profoundly changed the social. Greenhouse claims that neoliberalism has reconfigured public relationships that constitute belonging: politics, markets, work and self-identity. “These are the critical forms of social connection that neoliberalism’s emphasis on the separation of state and society and the marketisation of their relation puts in doubt—in everyday life and as matters of social theory”.¹⁰⁹

A feeling of belonging within the traditional community structures, and a community identity, is increasingly ‘breaking out’ of these traditional structures, which for many residents is a good thing. As Nathalia felt, an ideological wall is disappearing. At the same time, their diversity is emphasised outside of the community, when they go global, as their favela identity is stressed (by themselves as well as by outside actors). This relates to a neoliberal ambiguity summarised by Greenhouse, who claims that neoliberal states disrupt or displace traditional non-market based societies sustained by particular social relationships and values. In this respect, the neoliberal state is a “disordering order that divides humanity against itself and sets it against nature”. At the same time, however, this disorganised and uncoordinated character also provides new forms of public participation in broader capitalist frameworks.¹¹⁰

---

¹⁰⁸ Nathalia, interview, 26/05/2011.
¹⁰⁹ Nathalia, interview, 26/05/2011.
¹¹⁰ Fernando Coronil quoted in: Greenhouse, 2010: 5.
changes traditional feelings of belonging, identity and territory.

**Transcending borders**

Through Twitter these adolescents—both Descolando Ideias and Voz da Comunidade—are connected. In this way, they expand their network virtually in the first place. They start within the community linking to other adolescents, groups and activists. A couple of months ago they already announced #UNIÃO¹¹¹ (union) of several local activists, youngsters and artists active in Complexo do Alemão. On July 13¹⁰, they already talk about a movement (see figure 3).

![Figure 3. There is being formed a large youth movement in Complexo do Alemão. Examples are @vozdacomunidade, @fotoclubalemão and us.](image)

The Youth movement of Complexo do Alemão does not stay within the borders of their community. As they do their work mainly online physical borders are no longer relevant. However, through linking to other actors they also transcend ‘ideological borders’, establishing links with both residents from other favelas and actors from outside of the community such as companies, the government and organisations. Thus, on the one hand, residents from different favelas are now connected, while formerly they did not have as much ‘mobility’ to communicate with one another as they have today. This is not really a new phenomenon. One of the first platforms connecting various favelas was Viva Favela, a project by an NGO called Viva Rio. In a study on the use of a digital media platform Viva Favela, Bernardo Sorj points at the way in which this alternative medium provides the local people with the means to report about their lives from their own perspective, and thus, to produce a counter discourse to the traditional media that frame favela life as dangerous, criminal and disastrous.¹¹² Sorj concludes by pointing at the idea that the subject can play an active role in constructing history and transforming his or her reality through social movements, in which the Internet can play an enabling role.¹¹³ Although in the case of the platform Voz das Comunidades Rene he and his team are responsible for and the editors of all the content on the platform, they are connected to and interacting with other communities in a similar way. What they do on Twitter, however, is different. They link to other actors and the other way around, they involve in discussions that are more immediate and more lively than on the platform, as messages are directed towards people rather than responses to articles or previous comments, therefore demanding a response more explicitly than on platforms and easily attracting other people to engage in the discus-

---

¹¹¹ Via Twitter: Descolando Ideias: “@dinho_rio, @Edduggrau, @rene_silva_ri e nós colocando idéias atuais e futuras na mesa com o propósito de vamos fazer juntos! #UNIÃO” (“@dinho_rio, @Edduggrau, @rene_silva_ri it’s us putting actual and future ideas on the table, proposing to collaborate! #UNION”).


sion (as demonstrates the above discussion on the army’s intervention at the party).

On the other hand the networking element is very strong, as Nathalia herself already mentioned. For instance, she tells me how Descolando Ideias was approached by the founder of AfroReggae, an internationally known NGO working with music and culture in the favelas of Rio. They did not know each other, but this man, called José Junior, got interested in their work. When looking at Descolando Ideias’ tweets at their Twitter page I see links to other ‘big actors’ such as @cocacola, @Santander_br, @sergiocabralrj (the Rio de Janeiro State governor), etc. In this way, these actors ‘ideologically’ enter the community, while simultaneously this group of community residents feel they go beyond the boundaries of their community. In fact, through linking to other actors they claim a space to make their voice heard and they virtually expand their territory (the favela). Not only do they strengthen a network of favela residents all over Rio (through the portal and through Twitter in itself), Nathalia also tells me how they see that an ideological wall that used to surround the community, particularly maintained or reinforced through the media’s discriminating discourse, is now being torn down as these outside actors increasingly want to enter the community, virtually as well as physically.

The Internet certainly offers possibilities for Descolando Ideias and Voz da Comunidade, a tool they did not have before. Through digital technologies local activism can revolve around different scales through directly linking to ‘important’ actors. According to Sassen, global or transnational citizen participation evolves around local concerns and struggle. These local actors can become involved in a network that connects them to other actors, which are interconnected to each other on a global scale, and thus gain strength in their demand for the settlement of issues by institutions.114 Particularly the implementation of the UPP in other communities has raised a common issue among numerous favelas of Rio de Janeiro, which is currently being subject to discussion among residents of different favelas, reporting on issues varying from excessive garbage disturbing the residents to a video showing the new hotspots of the community from the cable car.115 An overall tendency, however, as most of the platforms are sponsored by outside actors (which can be the state government as well as a private company) is the publication of mostly positive stories, often about events organised for the community residents by outsides actors (who typically receive much credits for their work done).

Power to frame

While new media are advocated because of their democratic potential in the forms of independent community media (platforms, journals and Twitter)116, in this case they cannot be seen separated from the traditional mass media. One day during a discussion about the work of Voz da Comunidade and the portal someone mentioned that some residents prefer to send their stories to the mass media (f.i. Globo) than to the platform, thinking that the latter will not be recognised as serious news source. They also commented about some cases in which people do not know Rene personally, but through a news item on TV. Moreover, I read a Tweet

---

114 Sassen, 2006: 373.
115 Particularly the platform Voz das Comunidades focuses on the pacified favelas (except for Maré) and another platform set up by the Secretary of Culture connecting all the pacified favelas, but also “disorganised” networks of favela residents on Twitter and Facebook.
116 See, for instance, Atton and Hamilton, 2008; Bruns, 2008
by Rene that he was annoyed by the fact that often ‘others’ get the credits for the work he has done, referring to media companies who use his content to distribute in their news items. This means that part of the local information he produces returns to the community through the mainstream media rather than through his community journal, platform or Twitter. These examples show that the information distributed by these adolescents via the Internet often reaches the community residents in a very circuitous way. The information goes from local, to global, back to the local. But more importantly, big media companies have a big influence in the channelling and framing of this information. In this way I see a circulation of stories with ‘varying truths’. The community residents tend to communicate an alternative image of the so often stigmatised favela to the outside world, while, simultaneously, another truth about the favela returns to the residents through their TV screens and sensationalist newspapers; that of violence, criminality, and barbarism (see also chapter 1). This struggle over the power to frame the local reality of the favela is not yet won by the Youth movement, neither by other ‘independent’ activists such as Eddu Grau, who was offered to have his songs broadcasted by a commercial radio, but was kindly asked if he could soften his critical note and perhaps sing more about love. As Eddu Grau refused to adapt his repertoire according to their demand, they ended up not playing his music.117 These examples show how residents are stuck in a complex relationship of interdependence on the private sector, which partly impedes them from having an alternative or critical voice.

Opening up of the favela

Whereas Yúdice writes about the way in which marginalised youth in Rio takes back the fragmented city to them through the use of pop music and dance and to relocate them in it,118 Nathalia’s comment reflects a slightly different phenomenon. Besides relocating themselves into the city—what they do by their journalistic activities and the representation of the ‘alternative’ image of the favela—they are also opening up the favela for others to enter. This changes the perception of space and territory: virtually, the Youth movement maintains a strong proper identity, as they are concerned with the promotion of a positive image of the favela, but they are no longer tied to the local, physical territory of the community.

A very important (and extensive) contribution on the transforming relations between the local and the global comes from Saskia Sassen. She claims that digital networks evince in often complex imbrications with the nondigital.119 These imbrications are intertwinements of the local and the global, or the digital and the nondigital, which she illustrates using the term scales. As, for instance, an issue exists on a local scale, it may imbricate with actors globally. That is, a rescaling occurs as the local then becomes embedded in the global.120 This phenomenon, which Sassen calls multiscalar politics, is in fact a rescaling of hierarchy. This means that to reach other local communities that face equal issues; it is not necessary ‘to move from a set of nested scales from the local to the national to the international but can directly access

---

117 Eddu Grau, personal communication, 25/05/2011.
118 Yúdice, 2003: 91, emphasis mine.
119 Sassen, 2006: 330, 326
120 Sassen, 2006: 344
other such local actors in the same country or across borders. While Sassen here refers merely to civil society activism (and primarily in the form of NGOs), the Youth movement is entering a territory that transcends different scales as well as spheres. Their activities on Twitter are direct examples of how they rescale the local issues to another scale, that is, the trans-local scale connecting with groups in other favelas. But also do they disseminate their local issues in a network of NGOs, (Afro Reggae, CUFA: civil society sphere) the state (the governor Sergio Cabral, the army: public sector sphere) and the market (Coca cola, Santander, Globo, CNN: private sector sphere), varying from regional, national and global.

This calls into question traditional forms of politics based on a nation-state context. In the global and neoliberal era traditional institutions undergo radical changes. Politics, in this way, becomes multiscalar and very directly pointed towards the particular actors (Sergio Cabral, the army) or spheres (public, private, NGO). In this way the adolescents call attention from particular actors and demand action by responsible institutions (usually the government) for change. But what happens more often is a politics of lobbying on different scales, in order to establish partnerships and public relations with actors of importance for them or the community. These actors are mostly private companies, which profoundly changes traditional notions of citizenship. Where the state and its institutions are lacking, the (global) private sector is increasingly present in and engaging with the community.

The market’s Interest: using and being used

Where the first part of this chapter focused on the way in which the Youth movement expands the community’s territory virtually, this section will examine how the outside actors enter the community—both virtually and physically. The phenomenon of opening up applies to this interaction, or even intertwinement, of the community (the local) and the outside world (the global).

---

121 Sassen, 2006, 371.
Accumulation by dispossession

David Harvey has contributed extensively to the academic literature on neoliberalism; writing on the related deregulation of markets and the dismantling of institutions through the privatization of public sector services and agencies such as health care, education, transport, banks and telecommunication. It has taken to pieces existing narratives of the preceding era that promoted measures for a more egalitarian distribution of wealth.\textsuperscript{122} The impact of neoliberal reform is tremendous. Over the past decades, he argues, “[n]eoliberalism has become a hegemonic discourse with pervasive effects on ways of thought and political-economic practices to the point where it is now part of the commonsense way we interpret, live in, and understand the world.”\textsuperscript{123} Harvey claims that neoliberalism is a project that serves to redistribute wealth back from the masses to the upper classes, or, on a global scale, from the vulnerable to the richer countries. The process of transferring assets and channelling wealth and income into this direction he has called \textit{accumulation by dispossession}. This includes the privatisation of the commons and the continuation and rapid reproduction of primitive or original (as originally designated by Marx) accretion practices during the rise of capitalism.\textsuperscript{124} Typically, the right to commons is privatised, and services that used to be informally taken care of, such as telecommunications, housing, transport, and so forth are substituted by the formal economy.

As the previous chapter examined, the general informality of the community is being criminalised, and in this way the ‘pacification’ is paving the way for the market to enter. Harvey pointed to the fact that the role of the neoliberal state is reduced to preserving an institutional framework (military, police, defence and juridical functions) appropriate to secure private property rights and to support the free markets. Also, the state has to guarantee the quality and integrity of money.\textsuperscript{125} The occupation by the army and the implementation of the universal rule of law in the community help formalise the informal structures and allow the accumulation of capital by the private sector, which now claims its part of this territory.

‘Disseminating peace’

The Youth movement has emerged locally, without explicit help, neither financially nor on project basis, from external actors. But naturally, the encouragement by NGOs and the private sector plays an important role in their enthusiasm to continue their activities. While for now most of the support and interaction is through publicity by the media and calls from companies that inform the youngsters about actualities and activities they organise in the community (their journalistic function), increasingly companies provide financial support to the activities. Santander, for instance, awarded a price to Descolando Ideias\textsuperscript{126} during an event that was widely covered by the national media and visited by several ‘important’ people such as the Governor Sergio Cabral.

\textsuperscript{122} Harvey, 2007: 22.
\textsuperscript{123} Harvey, 2007: 22.
\textsuperscript{124} Harvey, 2007: 34-35, see here also his elaboration on \textit{accumulation by dispossession} in more detail.
\textsuperscript{125} Harvey, 2007: 22.
The sponsorships by the private sector result in a mutual dependence between the Youth movement and the sponsors. The expansion of their network to outside actors is both strategic from their side and a matter of interest from the latter in terms of social marketing.\textsuperscript{127} For the adolescents it is necessary for the simple fact of financial resources and recognition (which are two related factors). In fact, they use big companies to survive and to be able to make a living, as the private sector turned out to be much more efficient in financial terms than the bureaucratic road to public money.\textsuperscript{128} They benefit from the increased popularity of and interest in the favelas and of their ability to work with the Internet. That is, articulating to outside actors has become increasingly easy online, not only through the facility in terms of time and space, but not the least important, through the increased interest by the private sector to enter these areas. Both factors have helped them a lot to gain recognition and attention by the big media, and in the case of Rene, even globally. But simultaneously, they become to serve as the propagators of these big companies. Raul and Nathalia told me that during one of their walks through the community Santander offered them to sponsor caps and water bottles, which they could use when circulating through the community. Wearing these caps they would be protected against the hot sun and simultaneously disseminate the brand. Companies increasingly participate, sponsor or organise actions of ‘social responsibility’ to promote their brands and win new consumers in these areas with enormous opportunities in terms of accumulation.\textsuperscript{129} Examples are the \textit{Corrida da Paz} I briefly mentioned before, which took place on 15 May 2011 and was organised by AfroReggae, Santander and Coca Cola (residents have joked about the controversy of Coca Cola sponsoring a sports event that besides peace also promoted health) and PazCoa No Alemão (Easter Party). Also, Santander is about to engage in a partnership with Descolando Ideias, as Nathalia told me, in which the latter will help the company to construct a positive image in the community, thus generating new costumers in this not yet fully exploited territory. A short documentary on the work of Santander in Complexo do Alemão shows how the company uses the image of the ‘poor’ and the ‘oppressed’ (by former drugs gangs) to show its goodwill and empathy, claiming that it—almost like the Americans in Iraq—has “the challenge of winning over the hearts of the people of Rio de Janeiro”.\textsuperscript{130} Through the numerous cultural events Santander organised in the community it indeed tends to do so.

The \textit{Corrida da Paz} is an example of how these actors together organise an event that is particularly powerful within the community. The event gained a lot of media attention as well as a lot of interest by the community residents. They used a particular contested issue, which was the road through the fields connecting Complexo da Penha and Complexo do Alemão, across which the drugs gangs fled from the one hill to the other, as Complexo da Penha was invaded the day before Complexo do Alemão. At the time, the escape was widely covered by the


\textsuperscript{128} Raul, personal communication, 06/06/2011.


\textsuperscript{130} “Natal no Complexo do Alemão.” Retrieved from \url{http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uQKK9mnw_g} at 26/05/2011.
international media and became symbolic for the occupation of these two major favelas of Rio de Janeiro. They transformed this infamous event into something positive: the peace run. The word *peace* is particularly powerful as it indicates that this road that was used by the drugs traffickers to flee, now symbolises peace, suggesting that peace is brought to the community. In this way, Santander and Coca Cola claim their space in the community through the identification with peace.

*Favela branding*

Strategically, through articulation to local actors these newcomers promote their social responsibility, thus gaining trust and confidence by potential consumers. The company’s interaction with the community through symbolically linking their corporate identities to *peace* and the *favela* (or rather, the *poor*) personalises the relationships between corporations and the residents.

Yúdice claims that in our contemporary society the politics of culture converges citizenship and consumerism through inclusionary discourses on diversity and minorities. Multiculturalism is a project in media and consumer markets that exploits race, gender and sexuality for the accumulation of new consumers.\(^{131}\) TV commercials or marketing videos frame minorities (e.g. gays, Hispanics, blacks) as potent consumers by letting them promote the company’s products. However, notes Yúdice, it is striking that this “franchise for minorities” disseminated through consumerism is limited on class basis. The aim is primarily at the *middle class* and the poor are left out.\(^{132}\) Over the past years, however, a discourse is emerging aiming to subvert the stigma of the favela into a more positive image, particularly through focusing on culture rather than criminality. Citizen actions initiatives and youth cultural organisations, such as the Youth movement in Complexo do Alemão, are creating a positive image of their community, but also projects such as Viva Favela by the NGO Viva Rio, have tried to “heal the wounds of the divided city” in order to empower the poor and racialized youth, channelling violence and culture into “cultural citizenship”.\(^{133}\) Lately, the ‘pacification’ has put an extra emphasis on the positive side of the favela, which caused the favela to become *pop*, particular in the eyes of cultural organisations, NGOs and artists, but also as a new potential for tourism and business. Thus, rather than focusing merely on middle class minorities, companies such as Santander, Globo and Coca Cola increasingly join, or rather, support the work of civil society initiatives and organisations that aim at the ‘poor favela resident’.\(^{134}\) What Yúdice would perhaps call the “franchising of the poor” in fact has a double dimension in which on the one hand the favela becomes a new way through which companies can show their social responsibility and improve their corporate image, and on the other hand they marketize the favela’s informal economies thus accumulate new consumers. This phenomenon, which I would call *favela branding* is a strategy that rather than exploiting the images of violence and disaster, on which I

---

\(^{131}\) Yúdice, 2003: 167. See also Chun, 2006.

\(^{132}\) Yúdice, 2003: 174

\(^{133}\) Yúdice, 2003: 133, on Viva Rio in general. The particular project Viva Favela, by its aim to empower favela residents through journalistic participation, contributes to Viva Rio’s main aim to “use new favela culture to enfranchise poor youth […] and to communicate a new sense of citizenship, of belonging and participation, that included all classes, especially the poor.” 134-135.

\(^{134}\) Here again I want to refer to the video about the social responsibility of Santander.
touched briefly in the previous chapter, instead manipulates images of peace and social inclusion to ‘win the hearts of the people’ and to sell their brand to them.

Photo 7 - Santander’s 1 year anniversary in the community. Descolando Ideais was invited to join the celebration.

Conclusion

For the Youth movement in Complexo do Alemão the pacification has opened doors. Virtually they expand the community’s territory through linking to the residents of other favelas in Rio de Janeiro, but also through the articulation to outside actors such as private companies, the government or NGOs. This networking allows them to disseminate an alternative image of the often stigmatised favela. While ‘breaking out’ of the physical boundaries of the community, their favela identity remains stressed, by themselves as much as by outside actors to which they articulate. Different than a feeling of belonging as a form of resistance against the rest of society, as I described in chapter 1, here belonging indicates a longing to inclusion in and recognition by society, though a simultaneous maintaining of their own favela identity.

Importantly, the concept of networking indicates ‘interaction’ and occurs not a one-way direction. While the Youth movement expand its territory beyond the community, outside actors want to enter and strategically articulate to local actors and their activities, in this way claiming their space. The opening up of the community results in a complex struggle of using and being used. For the Youth movement it functions as a kind of lobbying for attention, (financial) support, and change on a translocal scale and in different spheres (public sector,
private sector, NGOs). In this very direct kind of politics relations are personalised and bureaucratic structures are circumvented. Simultaneously, private companies link their corporate images to the favela and peace, thus promoting their social responsibility and marketising the favelas informal structures, thus accumulating new consumers.
CHAPTER 3: Culture and citizenship

Those kinds of projects, organised by big NGOs, they aren’t meant for us [the community residents], or for the community. They only focus on the big media, on publicity.135

With the ‘pacification’ and the arrival of the state’s institutions in the community questions of citizenship become relevant. The ‘pacification’ project claims to aim at social inclusion, but has not yet proven to do so. Secretary of Public Security José Mariano Beltrame recognised that security alone is not enough to achieve peace. Instead, social investments are necessary.136 Culture is seen as an important means to promote citizenship. After the pacification the community is gaining a lot of interest by civil society organisations and cultural projects, as it is often agreed upon that culture educates, empowers and emancipates. Besides that, it provides an alternative to—especially youth and adolescents—engaging in criminal activities. During my stay various cultural projects and events have taken place and a myriad of reunions, meetings and lectures by—usually—outside actors (state secretaries, NGOs) occurred for future implementation of activities. Through my friendship with a ‘cultural agent’137 from the community I got to observe the struggle over the implementation of projects and the interests and money behind it, always leading to the big question: Who will actually benefit from this project? What is striking is that while a strong proper culture exists, namely the funk culture, it is heavily discriminated and at points even criminalised.

In addition to the previous chapters where I described the different ways in which the neoliberal state tries to gain control over the recently taken territories, this chapter will focus on culture and the industry of ‘culture in the favela’ and the way in which the struggle over the ‘production of meaning’, or, symbolic capital, is fought. As Yúdice claimed: culture is a struggle over meaning.138 NGOs and citizen initiatives play an important role in this; however, they cannot be seen separated from both the market and the state. I will examine how culture and cultural projects are implemented for the promotion of citizenship, but at the same time aiming at efficiency and profit. What is most contradictory is that while ‘empowerment’ of the poor is often said to be the main objective of such projects, in fact an existing hierarchy is reinforced.

To illustrate this I will use the case of Favela Festival, a project by NGO CUFA in collaboration with the State Secretary of Culture. First, however, I will briefly introduce funk and comment on the criminalisation of the prohibited funk and the centralisation of the production of funk in general, which in a similar way reinforces the centralised control of culture in the

---

135 Helen, Fazendinha, personal communication, 41, 10/05/2011
137 This ‘cultural agent’ functions as an articulator between residents and outside actors who want to implement cultural projects in the community.
Proibidão or prohibited funk

Shortly after the occupation in November 2010 a couple of MCs from Complexo do Alemão and Complexo da Penha were arrested for ‘apologia ao crime’.\textsuperscript{139} The lyrics of their funk songs were proibidão (strongly prohibited), which is a label that is used to classify funk songs that are an apology of crime and explicitly mention gang members and their (violent) acts. The MCs were accused for praising crime or the criminals, which is considered a crime in Brazil. Carioca funk (funk from Rio de Janeiro) is discriminated by the Brazilian middle and upper classes and associated with drugs trafficking and violence, and more generally, favela life. This arrest reflects the general discriminatory and exclusionary debate upheld by the Brazilian elite and media, treating the favela as the source of the problems related to criminality and trafficking rather than a result of the absence of the state and a history of exclusion and racism. At the same time, funk is increasingly popular outside of the favela. Bailes are not rarely frequented by middle class playboys and patricinhas\textsuperscript{140} and a news item by R7 showed that the funk industry renders over one million Reais\textsuperscript{141} a month. “You can see by the high frequentaion of the bailes how funk is significantly lucrative for the government”, says Jimmy Medeiros.\textsuperscript{142} While the proibidão is criminalised, funk in itself is a very lucrative market.

After the entrance of the army in the community the bailes became criminalised. Part of the reason is the prominence of proibidões during these parties. Proibidões glorify crime and the criminals, and besides that, are produced informally and distributed in an underground manner. American scholar Paul Sneed has studied funk and particularly focused on the proibidão. He found that these lyrics serve the drugs gangs to build legitimacy and strengthen their hegemony in the favelas, and thus the proibidão became an instrument of the parallel power to control the residents. The MCs glorify the acts of the drugs traffickers (especially the chefses) and the lyrics contain “complex images and codes that have arisen through the ideological processes that support the governance and power of criminal factions.”\textsuperscript{143} For instance, they always explicitly and rudely criticise the police and emphasise the unity and solidarity of the favela residents. An example of a proibidão is this following song, which led to the arrest of MC Smith described above.

```plaintext
He wanted money, he wanted power
He involved in Article 12 through the C.V.
FB is on alert, but look who’s talking
No one gave him nothing
He is very strong in the hierarchy
```

\textsuperscript{139} Apologia ao crime is, freely translated, “praising crime”, or legitimizing crime, an act that is considered crime in Brazil leading to detention of 3-6 months or a fine.

\textsuperscript{140} Playboys and Patricinhas are rich middle/upper class boys and girls.

\textsuperscript{141} Equivalent of $500,000.


\textsuperscript{143} Sneed, 2007: 222
Playing around with women
He is the [...] on the R1 [motorcycle]
The thickness of his necklace causes a “[zum zum zum]”
He has several women, several rifles at his disposition
He has the battalion of the area eating out of his hand
He can deal with the bad and the good
The same face can make you laugh as well as make you cry
Our life is bandit and our game is tough
Today we party, tomorrow we’ll be dead

---

Queria grana queria poder
Se envolveu no artigo 12 pela facção C.V
FB se liga só mas olha ele quem diria
Ninguém lhe dava nada
Tá forte na hierarquia
Abalando a mulherada
É o razante do falcão, em cima da R1
A grossura do cordão ta causando zum zum zum
Mas é varias mulher; vários fuzil a sua disposição
O batalhão da área comendo na sua mão
Ele tem disposição para o mal e para o bem
mesmo rosto que faz rir é o que faz chorar também
Nossa vida é bandida e o nosso jogo e bruto
Hoje somos festa, amanhã seremos luto

Article 12 involves any involvement in narco trafficking, consumption of “narcotic substances” or encouragement to consume. FB is the abbreviation of Fabiano Atanásio da Silva, the former chefe of Complexo da Penha, the neighbouring complex of favelas and residence of MC Smith. The lyric contains several admirations to the chefe, such as “he is very strong in the hierarchy”, “He has several women and rifles at his disposition” and “He has the battalion of the area eating out of his hand”. During my research I watched a video made by a community resident of a concert in the community by MC Smith after his release. Hundreds of youngsters and adolescents yelled and applauded him, joining in when he sang ‘C.V.’ and putting their arms in the air forming both letters (C.V.) with the fingers of each hand. In an interview MC Smith tells me that it is their local reality, in which they grow up. “What else would I be talking about?”

MC Leonardo, who defends the rights of the funkeiros points to the distorted vision of the

145 Interview MC Smith, 23/04/2011.
elite, who consider the proibidões incentives to criminality, through which they typically blame the favela rather than searching for explanations on the side of society. He tells me about a rightist TV personality using the example of a firm to refer to the Comando Vermelho:

[She] constructed a firm, you know, calling it Comando Vermelho, putting FB as the president of the firm, and other traffickers as employees. Then she created a marketing department of this firm and threw the MCs in this sector! In this way they blame the MCs for the formation of bandits.146

Although put more subtly and based on thorough analyses, Sneed raises the same issue. His analysis places the MCs, similarly to the elite in the example by MC Leonardo, as ‘propagators’ of the drugs gangs in order to build legitimacy. But the relation between the MCs and the drugs gangs seems more complex. Naturally, the praising words of the MCs disseminate a positive discourse about the drugs traffickers. However, in my opinion, the MCs’ words are a reflection of their local reality, not having much else to express. For those growing up in a criminal environment, which becomes their normalcy, legality does not always seem just, correct or good. Besides that, they are excluded from this reality in any way. “Telling the truth has become a crime in Brazil”, explains MC Leonardo.

The discrimination of funk by the elite maintains a division between the ‘civilised’ city with its high forms of art, and the ‘barbaric’ favelas characterised by a generalisation of non-aesthetical, bad quality funk. The criminalisation of the proibidão also suggests that funk is closely related to criminality and that, again, the favela is the source of problems denying any responsibility from the state’s part. Besides the informal structure of the baile, the prominence of the proibidão provides the government another justification for criminalisation of this form of leisure.

The prohibition of the baile has caused strong impact on the everyday lives of many youngsters in the community. One of the most common answers by residents in the age of fourteen to 25 when asking what they thought of the ‘pacification’ was: “It’s so boring, we don’t have anything to do. They took away our only form of entertainment!” With intense nostalgia the adolescents in Alvorada told me over and over about the weekly bailes at Coqueiro. They assured me that, if I would have been there before ‘they’ [the soldiers] arrived, I would have been shocked to see the reality of the bailes. The exposure of wealth through the golden necklaces and watches, designer clothes and accessories, beautiful, well dressed and high healed women, expensive cars an motorcycles, excessive drugs consumption and exclusive vodka and whiskey, and, of course, the amount of arms carried by often very young boys in order to guarantee the security of both the chefes and the audience. After the ‘pacification’ some of the residents would go to bailes in other, non-pacified favelas, but only to those of the same drugs faction. These were usually Jaquarezinho and Mangueira, of which the latter became occupied by the UPP halfway my stay (June 2011) meaning the end of the bailes there as well.

Commercialization of funk

Like the drugs traffickers themselves, who operate outside the hegemony of the Brazilian
state, the proibidão funk circulates only in an underground and illegal form. After the ‘pacification’ in Rio in general by the UPP police and in Complexo do Alemão in particular by the army, proibidão funk has been effectively repressed by the state. Eddu Grau argues that today the state is more capable to maintain a regime than the drugs traffickers in recent years. Not only because the drugs traffickers lost their physical territory, but also because they are losing an ideological space to exercise power and control the residents.

The traffickers lost space from the moment funk ceased being ‘from’ the community and became merely an industry, which does nothing more and nothing less than any other capitalist industry does: ‘exploiting the least disadvantaged’: the poor.

The proibidão that served as an instrument to the drugs traffickers is taken away and replaced by “commercial, banal and sexist funk”, which is often produced in a centralized manner. In the ‘pacified’ favelas the state has entered to repress the informal (proibidão) funk, paving the way for the funk industry to disseminate ‘mainstream’ funk. Not the least relevant, in this sense, is also the formalisation of the entire structure of the bailes I already addressed in the first chapter, rendering tax income for the state and direct profits for the industry, but serious financial consequences for many residents who used to work in the informal sector. Formerly, no one would pay entrance to a proibidão baile as everything used to be paid by the drugs traffickers who organised the party. This means that the latter also chose the kind of music they wanted to: the proibidão. Today the funk industry is paying, meaning that they decide what kind of music that will be played.

Photo 8 - Baile funk after the 'pacification'.

The necessity of informality

The criminalisation of the baile causes more impact that the mere substitution of the proi-

---

147 Sneed, 2007: 226.
148 Eddu Grau, interview, 16/08/2011.
149 Eddu Grau, interview, 16/08/2011.
150 Eddu Grau, interview, 16/08/2011.
bidão by commercial funk. In fact, the *baile* in particular and the informal structure of the funk industry lie at the core of (the initial part of) the production of funk. In an ethnographic study on funk as a *rhythm* (rather than focusing on the narrating function of the lyrics) Mylene Mizrahi provides insight in the logic that determines the rhythm's musical creativity, particularly focusing on the production. By studying the family, friends and professional network of funk artist Mr. Cantra, Mizrahi points to the importance of the rhythm in relation to the lyrics, which she calls the ‘não-proëminencia da palavra’ (the non-prominence of parole). In this article she elaborates on the informal way in which funk is produced, and the importance of informality for the quick and ephemeral character of funk, that is not only characterised in its beat (a simple melody) but as well in the way it is disseminated:

What distinguishes carioca funk [from other genres] is the liberality that rules the practice of its appropriative logic and the concomitant velocity through which it is put into motion, thanks to the informality that governs the relations between agents. The informality guarantees the efficiency of the funk product, of its appropriations, and simultaneously lever its distribution. Among *funkeiros*, contrary to what happens with electronic music productions produced in the formal music industry, you don’t ask formal authorisation. First one appropriates and ‘just let it go’ [deixar rolar], see what happens. As Sandro says: ‘In funk the guys hear a song, they immediately ‘poof’ [já pum]. They immediately do the loop, edit, and throw it in the song. But in electronic music, in House or Baltimore, the guys are more organised.’

The ‘relaxed’ attitude toward performance and artistic rights (copyrights) is fundamental for the quick circulation of the music and to ‘keep the funk’s flame burning’. Usually MCs perform and distribute a new song at bailes, and when the song starts to become a hit, he or she will register the song and record it at one of the few record companies; for instance, Link Records. If the artists register their songs before they distribute them, the rights are charged but this will hamper the functionality of the system.

Rights will be charged though, when the song is played “mechanically”, such as in concert halls, radio or TV. The MCs then record the songs at one of the few main record companies in the hands of DJ Marlboro and Romelo Costa (owner of a radio, record company and sound team Furação 2000), who are dominating the funk industry. As according to MC Leonardo, they appropriate the rights of the song and do not respect those of the artist, the MC, leaving the latter empty handed.

How will the formalisation affect the functionality of the informal funk industry? Now that *bailes* become increasingly criminalised, an important stage for MCs to distribute their new songs is taken away from them. Also, the registration of songs on forehand will profoundly impact the way in which the funk industry functions. Until the registration of a song by a record

---

152 Mizrahi, 2010: 196.
154 Mizrahi, 2010: 196.
155 Mizrahi, 2010: 196.
156 MC Leonardo, Interview, 15/04/2011.
company the structure is much more democratic: one produces, others take, use, produce, and so forth. The MC is rewarded when he performs at bailes. Important, in this regard, are the horizontal structures of the informal funk production:

The informality not only benefits the production, it also benefits the distribution. [...] the music was not made to be in the hands of a few, it has to circulate because funk ‘lives of this’ [how funk comes into being].

Formalisation would increasingly incorporate funk into the cultural industry. It would take funk from the community and contrarily to the above quote, put it in the hands of a few, projecting funk onto the favela as another product for consumption. This requires further research as we might argue whether we still see funk as a ‘proper culture’ or ‘social movement of youngsters’.

But also, as funk is not “made for this”, new ways are likely to emerge in order to continue the informal distribution of new songs produced in the favela and to circumvent the increasing vertical structures dominating the industry. Today, the prohibition of the baile does not yet mean the end of funk in the community. Today, residents organise bailes, but with permission from the army (see photo 9). According to the residents, however, these bailes are much different. As the photos show, this baile organised by the president of the community association of Canitar attracted few people. But funk is present in other ways as well. When I lent my cell phone to the son of the lady who hosted me during my stay, he returned it to me equipped with a rich variety of informally produced funk songs for incoming calls, my alarm and just for listening. Youngsters listen to these songs on their cell phones on the streets when they hang out, or those who do not have cell phones go to lan-houses (cyber cafés) to watch funk videos on Youtube. Some youngsters also produce, though in a rather playful way, playing funk on the streets. They imitate the MC, beatbox and dance the particular funk moves. The Internet already played an important role in the distribution of funk, and might increasingly substitute the role of the baile in the promotion of new songs by MCs. The Brazilian jeitinho will always find a way out. After all, funk professionals have to make a living.

What I have tried to point out here is how a particular space is contested, namely that of the funkeiros, through the neoliberal state. That is, aided by the ‘pacification’ the funk industry is entering this territory substituting local funk by commercial funk. Rather than promoting local cultural production, the consumption of culture is stimulated. Yúdice saw how funk was a proper culture of the racialised and poor classes, and used by the elite to keep them separated from the middle and upper classes. While discrimination on the basis of race is prohibited, the elite found how the favela resident could be discriminated on the basis of funk. Funkeiro indirectly referred to the black and poor population, associating them with violence and criminality. Today, however, the commercial funk is no longer seen as a direct threat that needs to be repressed and in the ‘pacified’ favelas funk parties are allowed, as long as there is no informally produced (proibidão) music, thus encouraging centrally produced and copy righted music. In this way, this not only impedes a dialogue between the funkeiros and other spheres, as funk

---

158 As described by Chaves de Olivieira, 2008: 2.
159 See: Yúdice, 2003; chapter 4.
is no longer from the favela, but in fact is projected on them from outside the favela and another product for consumption. Besides, a local production system based on horizontality is replaced by a system based on the logic of the formal market, exploiting culture and creativity. While Brazil showed a very progressive attitude toward copyrights and the bottom up and horizontal production of culture in the past eight years through, for instance, the *pontos de cultura*, the new Ministry of Culture has changed policy in favour of the cultural industry. In this regard, one might argue that the criminalisation of the informal funk industry aims to channel wealth and power in the hands of a few, thus reinforcing a particular hierarchy, rather than to combat the ‘glorification of crime’. I have used the example of funk to illustrate how a local culture exists and is recognised, but how local structures are replaced by the universal rules and structures of the dominant system. As I will show in the next part of this chapter, the implementation of cultural projects by civil society organisations or initiatives, while promoting citizenship, in a similar way reconfigures the local structures.

**Favela Festial**

In a paragraph called "The NGOization of Culture" Yúdice points to the tendency of NGOs using culture—in his particular example music and performance—as acts of citizenship. In the case of Afro Reggae, an NGO active in numerous favelas in Rio de Janeiro including Complexo do Alemão, these cultural acts aim to present a different image of discriminated poor black youth. Their performances pass on TV and in this way reach a national audience, thus using culture to demonstrate that the favela is more than mere criminality and misery. In this way, culture is claimed to be *empowering* and often used by NGOs as a means for social inclusion, promoting the process of civil society and democratisation. I would like to elaborate on this "NGOization of Culture" and how culture is used to promote citizenship by way of an event called Favela Festival, which occurred partly in Complexo do Alemão at the time of my research. Favela Festival was an initiative organised by a NGO called CUFA. CUFA stands for ‘Central Union of Slums’ and is an organisation that is recognised in the political, social sporting and cultural spheres. It was founded in the 1990s by youngsters from several favelas of Rio de Janeiro—"mainly blacks"—"who sought space to express their attitudes, or simply questioning their will to live." While they organise and offer cultural and sports activities of all kinds, hip hop is their main way of expression, serving as a tool for integration and social inclusion. For the organisation of Favela Festival CUFA gained support from the Rio de Janeiro state Secretary of Culture. It was a music festival providing a stage to talented MPB bands and musicians from the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, aimed to promote music styles other than

---


161 Yúdice, 2003: 154

162 Yúdice, 2003, 155, summarizing NGO’s annual reports in which they claim that culture has an empowering role.


164 Musica popular brasileira (Brazilian popular music).
funk within the favelas and thus breaking the stereotype of funk as the only kind of music. Regarding funk’s often negative connotation the idea was to de-stigmatise the favela by showing that other kinds of music indeed do exist.

The favela, with all its limitations, opens its doors for the festival leaving its problems aside. It shows to the world that its music, that used to be marginalised, has a big influence in our contemporary society, putting an end to the favela x asfalto stigma.\footnote{Freely translated from: “A favela, com todas as suas limitações, abre as portas para o festival deixando os problemas de lado e revelando ao mundo que sua música, antes marginalizada, tem grande influência na sociedade atual quebrando de vez o estigma “favela x asfalto.” Retrieved from http://www.favelafestival.com/2010/?pagina=favelafestival at 01/08/2011.}

The format of the festival was American Idols-like, with weekly shows in different favelas of Rio de Janeiro. Each week different artists who were selected after their application would perform. A judge would select the three best, who would pass to the semi final and subsequently to the final, which would take place in Complexo do Alemão. The winner of the festival would win a prize of R$3,000\footnote{Equivalent of $1500.} and got offered a record deal with Som Livre, which is the label of Globo, one of the sponsors of the festival.\footnote{See also: https://twitter.com/#!/batukdgueto and “Batuk do Gueto Campeão Favela Festival”, retrieved from http://informeprimeiramao.com.br/site/entreterimento/batuk-d%2E%28%29%20gueto-campeao-favela-festival at 10/08/2011.}

The finals took place on the 14\textsuperscript{th} of May at Campo do Sargento in Casinhas, Complexo do Alemão. There was a huge stage, a VIP area on the other side at which, besides invitees of the participants and organisers, the judges were seated for the best view. The Campo (half size football field) served for the audience, but was way too big for the amount of people, or rather, there were too few people for a concert of this kind. The finalists were, in my opinion, all very talented artists and bands, with music varying from samba, forró, samba-rock, rock, and pop. The performances would be followed by a show of Caetano Veloso, one of Brazil’s most famous MPB artists and, to give in to the general musical preference, in between the shows by the finalists a famous sound team\footnote{Equipe de som: sound team providing the equipment, DJs and MCs for the bailes.} played some funk. There was a lot of enthusiasm for this project; showing a positive side of the favela today is considered important, not only from the side of the favela, but also by the government (and market) with the eye on the ‘pacification’ project and the World Cup and Olympic Games. Also, the participating artists gained a lot of visibility. CUFA produced several short documentaries about the finalists, Globo as a sponsor took care of the festival’s publicity, and so forth.

When all participants had performed the judges would come together and pick a winner. Different than other rounds, during the final the judges were not asked to evaluate each performance, nor where they grading like they used to do in the previous rounds. When they came to a decision, it turned out that there was a \textit{shared} second and first place. A video, broadcasted at that very moment, would explain that the \textit{actual} final would be the next Sunday; \textit{live} in one of the most famous national TV shows presented by Faustão at TV Globo. Rather than the judges the Brazilian audience would vote. What struck me was the fact that the video was recorded \textit{in broad daylight}—the show took place at night—meaning that the organizers did not even try to make the audience believe this shared place was not planned beforehand, which
questions the role of the judges in any way. For the two artists who would perform on the national TV and for CUFA and the State Secretary of Culture this would render a lot of publicity. Also, Globo would benefit of this by broadcasting the real final for the national audience, and at the same time it could promote the winning band as the record label that would record the winning song belongs to the same company. The increasing influence of the private sector in projects promoting citizenship shift the focus (and impact) from the local scales, at which the event takes place, to a broader scale in which the event is covered and disseminated by the media and becomes subject to a national (or perhaps even global) audience.

**Competitive Ideology**

What struck me was the competitive ideology behind the festival. In a competition there can only be one winner, and all the others lose, causing the disappointment of the large majority of both the participants and the audience. This is very contradictory to promoting talent (regardless of whether it is possible to compare and categorise artists of different styles and genres). When the festival ended, there were only a handful of happy people leaving the place. The atmosphere had changed completely. Whereas American Idols is profit-based and therefore meant to attract a large audience, this project aimed at the promotion of talent in favelas, using music as a tool for social inclusion. However, when trying to ‘measure’ or classify cultural or artistic performances on a scale from bad to good, art and performance is attached to ‘value’ relative to others, and thus capital. Rather than the “individualistic language of the rights” and other “Westernised social circuits” social life in the favela is regulated through other principles, as similarly described by DaMatta. For citizenship initiatives and social movements or organisations to coordinate social change through culture they must take into account different ethnic backgrounds, respect for one’s elders, protection expected from superiors, informal networks of mutual aid, and so forth. In my opinion, the individualistic character of competition is contrary to the personal and religious networks of the favela.

Fernandes complements an argument by Yúdice claiming that culture and the arts have become instruments to improve social conditions in the function of economic development. Culture is thus seen as a development tool and economic efficiency can be achieved through the deepening of cultural development (as stated by UNESCO). Rather than culture as an end in itself, it is increasingly seen as a means for economic growth and for the amelioration of social problems. Considering the influence of the private sector in cultural projects, an observation by Sassen is relevant: “The neutrality attributed to the markets makes them critical to attaining efficiency and hence to the overall public benefit. As efficiency becomes the objective, it tends to replace or function as a stand-in for the public interests. The ideal of the regulatory state has given way to that of the competitive state whose new norm is to maximize efficiency.”

As culture has become a means to promote citizenship it indirectly serves a neoliberal

---

172 Sassen, 2006: 196.
ideology. Again, as Yúdice notes in relation to the NGOzation of culture, the construction of a positive image of the favela differentiates a civil society grounded in cultural citizenship from a barbaric and violent society. But, he claims, “civil society increasingly looks like an alibi for neoliberalism and provides the terrain in which it takes root.”¹⁷³ In relation to this, the Brazilian tax system called Lei Rouanet encourages firms to deduct a certain percentage of the income tax for the financing of cultural projects. This law makes it attractive for companies to sponsor cultural projects and events, but they have the tendency to pick initiatives that are interesting in terms of marketing. Companies want to be associated with some projects and not with others, bigger projects are often more interesting as more people participate and thus see the company’s involvement with this particular project, and so forth.¹⁷⁴ Thus, the financing firm certainly has a stake in sponsoring and often steer the activities in a particular direction (that is more profitable and thus interesting). In relation to the private sector’s influence, Fernandes summarizes an observation by Yúdice that “in a neoliberal era the field of culture itself becomes regulated by an economic rationality based on utility. Instrumentalized art and culture are actively recruited by states and foundations to improve social conditions, support civic participation, or spur economic growth.”¹⁷⁵ In relation to Favela Festival, the spur for economic growth lies in its attempt to commercialise the music of the artists and to provide the artists space in the traditional media to disseminate their music.¹⁷⁶ In fact, as argues Sorj, NGOs are not so much alternative or opposed to the public and private sector, instead, they should be viewed as a continuum of them.¹⁷⁷ In other words, culture, NGOs and the private sector are becoming interdependent.

Favela x Asfalto stigma

The previous chapter has demonstrated the attempts to disseminate a positive image of the favela, showing other sides than mere violence. The latter has been a preoccupation of NGOs over the past years, concerned with the negative image and stigmatization of the favela and the favelado. In fact, both words used to have a very negative and prejudging connotation—particularly when used by non-favela residents—and several projects have worked in order to subvert this. Viva Favela is a project by NGO Viva Rio, which is an open news portal of which the content is managed and uploaded by favela residents from Rio de Janeiro, thus providing a voice to the favela residents and inverting the negative connotation of the favela.¹⁷⁸ The name *Viva Favela* contributes to this breaking the prejudice of the word and linking it to a positive side of the favela. Also, CUFA mentioned the breaking of the favela versus asfalto stigma as one of the main objectives of the Favela Festival. Furthermore, the platform launched by Rene, Voz das Comunidades, similarly to Viva Favela tends to provide news from the favela that is ignored by the mainstream media, creating an alternative and rather positive image. Note, however, that the latter project emphasises the denomination community rather than favela. What all

¹⁷³ Yúdice, 2003: 158.
these examples have in common is a treating of the favela as different; they name it, point at it, and thus reinforce the idea that the favela is separated from the rest of society. Yúdice already noticed this describing how Afro Reggae produces a counter stereotype to that of criminality and victimhood using music and dance. However, this counter stereotype, although dignified, in fact reinforces the stereotype of the poor.\textsuperscript{179} CUFA (Central Union of Slums) contradicts this objective by its own name, which in fact emphasises the favela x asfalto dichotomy.

\textbf{Photo 9 - Favela Festival.}

What this also does is reinforcing the idea that the favela needs help. The favela resident is still framed as a ‘victim’, even though dignified. This justifies a very top-down implementation of projects whereby middle class actors are employed or paid to ‘empower’ or socially include the poor. Yúdice and Fernandes have argued how instead of democratising culture public funding we see a technocratic management and regulation of culture. This includes the sub-ordination of artists and communities to “experts”, or the so-called Arts administrators, who “utilise” culture in order to become the mediators between the funding sources and the community.\textsuperscript{180} As Fernandes claims, “Arts administrators are self-styled experts who presume to know better than local leaders what is good for the community.”\textsuperscript{181}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[179] Yúdice, 2003: 189.
\item[181] Fernandes, 2010: 108
\end{footnotes}
The quote at the outset of this chapter is illustrating: The lady argued that these events are organised to be covered by the big media, so that the entire country can see what good work they do. I knew what she meant when I saw the propaganda for the festival passing on TV. Globo announced “Favela Festival, followed by a show of Caetano Veloso, 14\textsuperscript{th} of May in Complexo do Alemão”. It did not mention the exact location (“Complexo do Alemão” is very vague considering the size of the complex; usually the name of the square or park where an event takes place is announced), nor the time. Even though this announcement passed quite frequently on TV, it very implicitly impeded people from going to the event. Apart from a few sound cars circulating through the community at the day of the final there was not much done to disseminate the event among the residents. Moreover, both Caetano Veloso—people complained that although famous his music is not very much appreciated in the community—and sound team 	extit{Big Mix}—owned by DJ Marlboro—were choices that did not respond to the general interests of the community. Different than Big Mix another sound teams such as the local 	extit{Lazer Digital}, would attract more residents. Rather than taking into account the local structures, a predetermined format is imposed on the community.

Indeed, during the final, considering the scale of the event the turnout was somewhat disappointing. Many residents complained that the organizers of the events do not interact with or consult them, not fully benefitting from the money and structures available to organise a project. Also, residents complain that festivals and events occur near the 	extit{asfalto} to assure visibility. Alvorada, for instance, is an area that is basically neglected. Ever since the 	extit{bailes} became criminalized, rarely any events occur in that area. A lady complained: “All events and festivals take place at [near] the asfalto! They [NGOs, cultural projects, events] never come up here and organise something for the youth here!” At the same time few people go down the hill to participate in those events taking place near the asfalto.

What frustrates the residents is the idea that people come to do work in their community being paid (a lot), while they themselves know the community’s social reality and know what they need most, but lack infrastructure, financial resources and recognition by potential sponsors and financing bodies.

\textbf{The value of poverty}

Whereas culture can be used to promote citizenship, economic efficiency and development in order for the free market to function optimally, working with ‘poverty’ also has another function. In a very controversial documentary by Dutch journalist and documentary maker Renzo Martens, (western) development aid is heavily criticised by putting the central question: \textit{Who owns poverty?}\textsuperscript{182} In his work he reveals the paradox of portraying poverty: while it immediately sets in motion an economy, the poor themselves fail to profit in any way. “The consumption of poverty is the mechanism behind the logic of capitalism.”\textsuperscript{183}

During my stay in the community numerous residents came to me and, not rarely resentfully, asked: “For which NGO are you working?”, “Are you working at AfroReggae?”, “Are you a journalist”. Often, when I told them I was doing a ‘school assignment’ they relaxed and

\textsuperscript{182} 
Enjoy Poverty, 2009, Renzo Martens.

\textsuperscript{183} 
Roo, de, 2011: 141.
changed their, at times somewhat aggressive, attitude. Rather than, or perhaps besides a critique to the paternalistic or top-down character that is typical for big or international NGOs, I think these residents were rejecting the ‘exploitation’ of their poverty by outside actors. Without their misery the NGO industry would not exist, and the residents are aware of that. During Favela Festival this has also been the case; whereas during normal concerts an artist gets paid, the participants of the Festival did not receive any payment (except for the winners). The organising bodies, on the other hand, receive sponsorships and subsidies that, given the size and format of the event, were not insignificant. The critique also applies to a project that initiated two weeks before I would hand in this thesis, called Wiki Mapa. The aim is to map the local points of reference, such as shops, bank agencies, supermarkets, health care centres, and so forth. Via Facebook I saw the myriad of photos of the event, at which the Youth movement and Eddu Grau were present. Photos demonstrated how the youngsters were equipped with smart phones sponsored by Vivo, Telefonica (telecom companies), Nike and Rede Jovem (an NGO), the organisers of the project, with which they will provide the information and put it on the virtual map. The creation of cartographies is a very interesting activity, especially in relation to space and territory. It allows the youngsters to put their proper community on the map in a very democratic way, rather than have it mapped by an institution or company from outside. However, the media return for the sponsors and initiators is enormous compared to the return for the youngsters that provide the information; they get R$200 a month for this laborious activity.

Another example that is slightly different but in fact comes down to the same, are the numerous meetings I joined between community residents (association presidents, Mulheres da Paz/Peace Women, cultural agents, the Youth movement) and outside actors; usually functionaries of the Rio de Janeiro state Secretary (of Culture, of Public Security, of Human Rights, and so forth). During several of these meetings I saw furious reactions by residents arguing that they are not consulted or included in decision-making processes, or complaining about the fact that every time these functionaries come, discuss, promise, leave again, and do nothing. While the functionaries are paid by the State Secretary to have these meetings and to get to the community by taxi, the residents feel that they have to show up every time again, in their free time, without much is being done. What causes most frustration is that residents often have plenty of ideas about necessary projects, but their opinion and knowledge are (mostly) ignored by those who have the money and power to implement projects. The ‘using’ of their poverty similarly applies to documentary makers who claim artistic rights onto a story they tell about ‘their’ reality, researchers like me (I am guilty here as well) who use ‘their’ life to get academic recognition and a degree.

The above all relates to a phenomenon Harvey has coined as ‘the art of rent’ and on which Matteo Pasquinelli elaborates in an essay on ‘immaterial civil war (ICW)’. Harvey de-

---

184 See, for instance: Henshaw-Plath, 2006: 136. He claims that NGOs have become institutionalized, maintaining top down, centralised and hierarchical structures, operating like corporations and governments. Usually, the people at the bottom of the organisation’s hierarchy experience very little decision-making power, let alone those that are outside the organisation, or rather, the citizens they are supposed to represent.

185 Equivalent of $100.

186 A project by the State Secretary of Public Security aiming to encourage women through the building and strengthening of social networks, coping to prevent violence against young women.
scribes another form of accumulation by dispossession that occurs in the *immaterial* form. It is the capitalisation of ‘symbolic capital’; the intangible production of ideas, meaning and culture. Harvey has developed the idea of the commodification of symbolic capital in his eponymous essay ‘The Art of Rent: Globalization and the Commodification of Culture’. In it he explains how symbolic capital is capitalized and in this way linked to ‘real money’ in a, as Pasquinelli calls it, “parasitic way”. In other words, private companies, such as real estate companies or tourist agencies, monopolize the production of culture as social capital. Harvey gives as an example Barcelona, a city that through its cultural value has become an international brand, and to which, for instance, the real estate or gastronomy sector relates in a parasitical way. Rather than intellectual property, where immaterial assets are being copyrighted under the name of the author or artist, this is the “parasitic exploitation of the immaterial domain by the material one.”

The symbolic capital of the favela has risen in ‘value’ over the past years (positive framing, ‘pacification’). At the same time, as I stated earlier, poverty renders money, especially for the implementation of (cultural) projects that promote citizenship and ‘empowerment’. In this way, outside actors ‘use’ favela life and in a parasitical way relate to their reality, linking it to real money: intellectual property in the case of artistic productions and researchers, salaries and subsidies in the case of NGOs and citizen initiatives and marketing leading to increased sales by the private sector. There is a constant—territorial—struggle over ‘symbolic capital’, to which outside actors relate parasitically, without the community gaining anything in return.

It is a matter of determining which segments of the population are to benefit most from the collective symbolic capital to which everyone has, in their own distinctive ways, contributed both now and in the past. Why let the monopoly rent attached to that symbolic capital be captured only by the multinationals or by a small powerful segment of the local bourgeoisie?

As I wrote in chapter 2, the Youth movement is involved in the fight over this symbolic capital, for instance through their attempts to frame the favela positively, and also, through the favela tour they organise. In this way, they claim their own part of the ‘rent’ attached to the symbolic capital. At the same time, however, precisely these actions by these youngsters are again ‘exploited’ through news items at commercial TV, sponsorships by Santander, and so forth. As Harvey noticed, the difficulty is that the more local activists try to counter the parasitical relation of the multinationals, the more valuable becomes their symbolic capital. “Global capitalism needs anti-global resistance to improve the monopoly rent.” The value of symbolic capital decreases when the favela loses its ‘uniqueness’, as explains Harvey. As long as the eyes of the world (at least those of the country) are focused on the favela, this will only increase.

---

187 Harvey, D. ([http://www.generation-online.org/c/fc_rent1.htm](http://www.generation-online.org/c/fc_rent1.htm)).
188 Harvey, D. ([http://www.generation-online.org/c/fc_rent1.htm](http://www.generation-online.org/c/fc_rent1.htm)) and Pasquinelli, 2007: 76.
189 Pasquinelli, 2007: 76.
190 David Harvey in Paquinelli, 2007: 79.
191 Pasquinelli, 2007: 79.
192 Pasquinelli, 2007: 79.
Conclusion
In this chapter the struggle over the production of meaning is fought between the residents and the neoliberal state. Those who ‘control’ culture in a way also ‘control’ meaning. As the ‘pacification’ project aimed at social inclusion and culture is seen as a means to achieve citizenship, numerous cultural projects are implemented in the community by outside actors. There is, however, a tendency in which culture is increasingly taken ‘from’ the community and projected onto it, as demonstrated the case of funk. In addition, the top-down implementation of projects often ignores the local reality. Big projects such as Favela Festival are disseminated by the national media more than within the community. In this way, the importance of the event takes place on a national level rather than locally. Furthermore, the competitive ideology that is stimulated through Favela Festival implies that, rather than ‘empowering’, culture is used as a means for economic efficiency and development. Finally, there is taking place an exploitation of the local reality of the favela. The symbolic capital of the favela is attached to a monopoly rent that is captured not by the community itself but by outside actors. What is contradictory is that on the one hand the production of meaning is increasingly taken from the favela. On the other hand, however, the (production of) local culture—and thus symbolic capital—is important for outside actors to relate to. As Yúdice claimed: culture is a struggle over meaning. Both the residents (the Youth movement, Eddu Grau; see also the previous chapter) and outside actors are involved in this struggle.

193 Yúdice, 2003: 86, emphasis mine.
Conclusion

In this thesis I have attempted to examine space, or more specifically, locality, in a neoliberal context. Neoliberalism is increasingly reconfiguring the social, political and economic structures that constitute locality. In Complexo do Alemão, where the state has been absent for decades, the state-market annex, or the neoliberal state, now substitutes the former parallel power, impacting the lives of the residents in a myriad of ways. As each chapter has demonstrated, traditional notions of space are radically changing. The community is increasingly opening up; residents break out of the traditional community structure, while outside actors enter. In this work I have studied space in terms of locality; and more specifically as a feeling of belonging, identity and meaning (symbolic capital). Each chapter has focused on one of these issues in order to reveal the changing dynamics of locality.

Through the physical presence of the army the state claims this territory. The criminalisation of informality and the implementation of the state’s laws and rules is a way to include the community residents in the state’s bureaucracy, and inherently a process of power and a way to “keep people in their places”. Whereas social life in the community used to be characterised by networks of personal relationships, the universal rules of the state are increasingly interfering in the traditional structures. The uncertainty about the present and the future, typical for the ‘liquid times’ of globalisation as formulated by Bauman, results in a strong feeling of nostalgia to the past times. In some cases, a feeling of belonging among community residents is maintained, or reinforced, through this nostalgia. In others, fear for drugs traffickers who are still present— although physically less prominent—and a distrust in the state’s interests constitute a feeling of belonging that is rather ‘in-between’. Most residents continue their everyday lives and try to find a way to survive in between legality and informality.

Moreover, whereas a feeling of belonging is constructed by the social relations among community residents, the favela identity demarcates the territory of the favela in relation to the outside world. The favela identity is becoming disconnected from the physical territory of the community. Particularly through new media (Facebook, Twitter, Wiki Mapa, platforms) the community residents expand their territory beyond the physical boundaries of the community, tearing down an ideological wall. The favela identity not only connects favela residents all over Rio de Janeiro, it is also used by the Youth movement to link to global actors. In a way, these youngsters ‘sell’ their identity to private companies, which the latter link it to their corporate image by supporting and sponsoring the youngster’s social and cultural activities. This latter phenomenon I call favela branding, which entails a double dimension of improving their image of social responsibility on the one hand, and marketising the informal structures of the favela on the other hand.

In addition to that, the production of meaning, through culture, is being taken from the favela and projected onto it by outside actors. This happens in the case of funk, where the informal production becomes criminalised and funk is increasingly incorporated in the cultural

---

194 Storey, 2001: 165.
industry, but also through the top-down implementation of cultural activities rather than the stimulation of bottom up projects. Favela Festival is an example of how the interconnectedness of NGOs, the public and the private sector have a particular stake in the implementation of cultural projects, and rather than promoting local production of culture they impose a particular framework on the community, which serves an neoliberal ideology. At the same time, the local social reality—the symbolic capital—is monopolised in a parasitical way, not only by the cultural industry, but also by NGOs, documentary makers, the media, researchers, and so forth. In this way, the community residents do not benefit from it.

Citizenship and resistance

With the entrance of the neoliberal state questions of citizenship become of relevance. Through the ‘pacification’ the state aims to socially include the favela residents, and the arrival of the state and its institutions in the favela suggests citizenship. In a globalising world, however, citizenship becomes increasingly complex. Ferguson & Gupta already called for new notions of civil society, as transnational civil society organisations are operating on a global level. Sassen noticed the emergence of the ‘translocal’, in which different localities are connected on a global scale. In this way, the state can no longer be seen as an institution above civil society. Greenhouse stresses the potential and need of ethnography to recognise political agency in neoliberal times. In the case of the Youth movement, I recognise political agency in the ways in which they directly link to actors and institutions of their interest, thus establishing partnerships on aspects were the state is lacking, such as subsidy for cultural events and festivals in the community. At the same time, however, we must be alert to the efficient character of the market (and the NGO sector as well). While it tends to function as a stand-in for the public interests, the interests behind these socially responsible projects are aimed at economic growth and the accumulation of new consumers. In this way, the neoliberal state claims its territory and citizenship and consumption become intertwined.

Moreover, Yúdice already argued that while citizenship is seen as the basis for civic organisation and organised forms of resistance, civil society is precisely where neoliberalism takes root. However, the entrance of the neoliberal state and the criminalisation of the informal practices in the community cause numerous problems for the residents. Rather than ‘inclusion’ in the state’s formal system, residents find alternative ways to survive, often continuing in informality. These unorganised and “everyday forms of resistance” can be seen as a hidden protest against the state’s attempt to include the community residents in its formal system. Not because they do not want to be included, but because the alternatives offered are not beneficial for most of the residents, creating more problems rather than facilitating their lives. While ‘peace’ has arrived, opportunities have not (yet).

Locality on different scales

In the ‘global’ favela locality must be seen on different scales, varying from the local to the

---

196 Yúdice, 2003: 158.
global, but present as a strong identity that is reinforced by the residents itself as well as by the outside actors. The interaction between these different scales is rather complex. While the residents try to bring an alternative and positive image to the fore, thus breaking the stigma of the favela, often another image enters the favela through the TV screens in the residents’ living rooms. The production of meaning, or claiming of territory, in the global (virtual) space does not directly interact with some parts of the local, where the mass media enter with a distorted image of ‘their’ reality, and which, at its turn, impacts locality, or the feeling of belonging, of the residents locally (e.g. instigation of fear). Appadurai speaks of the monopolising the moral resources of a people, which are attempts by the state to attain power and control over groups and spaces. Here this occurs through the dissemination of a particular image throughout the favela, which is not produced by the residents themselves but by the media and the private sector, often in complex relations with NGOs and civil society initiatives. Whereas in Appadurai’s notion the state tends to gain control over the residents, in the current context it is the neoliberal state, which claims its space, affecting residents in different ways.

The youngsters are affected most in these new times. While the adolescents in Alvorada feel they lost their liberty, for the Youth movement an ideological wall that was separating them from the rest of society is disappearing. It was precisely this ‘wall’, however, that for the adolescents demarcated ‘their’ territory, and in which the soldiers are now present. What is common, however, among residents is the way in which they claim space through calling attention on different scales. One the one hand there are the Adolescents in Alvorada expressing their “everyday forms of resistance”, by teasing the soldiers and through acts of vandalism, thus becoming a person in that very moment. And on the other hand, we see the Youth movement on the Internet, transforming themselves from invisible favela residents into ‘icons’ of the favela. Even though in different ways, in both cases these groups aim at visibility and attention, transforming oneself from a invisible individual into a person.

References


Duffield, M. “Social Reconstruction and the Radicalization of Development: Aid as a Relation of


Harvey, D. “Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction” in *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 2007; pp. 21 - 44


*News Items (online)*


(18/04/2011), O Dia Online: “Cabral anuncia Internet gratuita no Complexo do Alemão em junho”


Websites

“a Cufa”,
Classe Social Wikipedia

DIEESE

Favela Festival
http://www.favelafestival.com/2010

Jornal Voz da Comunidade

“O Festival”

POMA’s official website

Videos and Documentaries


